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Abstract
War and the extent of mass mobilization for war has a signicant impact on a wide variety
of economic and political development outcomes. In this paper, we investigate to what extent
technological change has inuenced the choice by governments to eld mass armies. Focusing on
a sample of thirteen great powers between 1600 and 2000 we argue that changes in transport and
communications technology were the single most important factor that ushered in the era of the
mass army and subsequently led to its demise. During the nineteenth century the development
of the railroad made it possible for the rst time to mobilize and feed armies numbering in the
millions. During the late twentieth century further advances in transport and communications
technology made it possible to deliver explosive force from a distance and with precision, making
mass armies less desirable. We nd strong support for our technological interpretation using a
new data set that measures army size, population mobilization, and methods of recruitment from
the beginning of the seventeenth century. In so doing we also consider several other plausible
determinants of military mobilization. Contrary to what is often suggested by scholars, we nd
little evidence that the French Revolution and the invention of the concept of the nation in
armswas associated with a substantial increase in levels of mobilization across nations. Even
for the French case alone, the magnitude of what is sometimes referred to as the Napoleonic
watershedwas smaller than what is often believed.
1 Introduction
War, and in particular mass warfare, matters for a wide variety of important economic outcomes.
The mass wars of the twentieth century were associated with a dramatic drop in top income
shares in participant countries.1 They were also associated with a signicant shift towards
more progressive tax systems.2 Further, many have argued that mass warfare was critical
in ushering in the era of the welfare state.3 Finally, it is also widely suggested that war
participation prompts states to build bureaucratic capacity, and mass warfare is certainly no
exception.4 Given that mass warfare matters for all of these economic outcomes, in addition
to its more obvious destructive e¤ects on capital and human life, it makes sense to ask what
factors over time have determined the ability to and desirability for a state to eld a mass
army. One tradition among historians and economic historians suggests that over the centuries,
the nature and scale of warfare has depended critically upon technological change, whether it
be the introduction of the iron stirrup, use of gunpowder technology, or the invention of new
styles of fortication.5 While scholars in this tradition have focused primarily on investigating
the Military Revolution of the early modern period, in this paper we suggest that a similar
focus on technological change may help us explain the incidence of mass warfare over a more
recent period. We argue that changes in communications and transport technology, and in
particular the invention of the railroad, constituted the most important factor in ushering in an
era of mass warfare where armies numbered in the millions. Subsequently, further changes in
communications and transport technologies that made it possible to remotely deliver explosive
force have made it less necessary and less desirable to mobilize a mass army. The implication
then is that the era of the mass army was a bounded period dependent on a specic state of
technological development.
Military historians have long pointed to the importance of the railroad for the scale of
1Piketty (2001), Atkinson and Piketty (2007).
2Scheve and Stasavage (2010, 2012).
3Titmuss (1950, 1958).
4Tilly (1975, 1990), Besley and Persson (2009), and Gennaioli and Voth (2011). See Dincecco and Prado
(2012) for an empirical analysis, as well as the discussion by OBrien (2011) of the British case.
5For a recent example see Ho¤man (2011). For other prominent examples see Roberts (1956), White (1962),
Bean (1973) and Parker (1976).
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military mobilization, but this argument has yet to be exposed to a systematic test.6 Though
it would hardly be surprising to see from this that railroads mattered, we still need to establish
just how much they mattered. We follow the work of military historians in suggesting that
prior to the invention of the railroad, large armies faced a fundamental problem of logistics.
While soldiers could transport themselves, their supplies had to be carried. The long-standing
alternative to this was for armies to forage, but this then meant that the size of an army was
constrained by the agricultural productivity of the land across which it marched. The adoption
of the railroad by militaries changed this situation completely as it was now possible to transport
men, munitions, and food in such quantities and with such speed that armies numbering in the
millions could become a reality. The parallel development of the telegraph made it possible
to command operations on this scale. Armies representing ten percent or more of a societys
total population suddenly became feasible, and to nd such numbers of individuals, states were
obliged to recruit from a broad segment of society.
While descriptions of military mobilization over the long run generally refer to a secular
trend towards increasing army size, by now any satisfactory explanation ought to also be able
to account for the more recent trend away from mass armies. There are no doubt multiple
plausible explanations here, one of which would be changing norms. Without dismissing such
accounts, in what follows we suggest that even in the absence of these factors, developments
in communications and transport technology may have greatly reduced incentives for states to
mobilize mass armies. The inventions of the industrial revolution made it possible to move men
and their supplies with unprecedented speed. More recent developments in communications and
transport technologies involving the gyroscope, the laser, radar, the computer, and satellites have
made it possible to deliver explosive force remotely with unprecedented e¤ectiveness. It would
be hard to argue that the invention of nuclear weapons did not also play a role in ending the era
of the mass army, but it should be remembered that as early as 1946, Bernard Brodie observed
that in the nuclear age the development of missile and guidance technology would be critical.7
6See in particular Pratt (1915), van Creveld (1977, 1989), Westwood (1980), Wolmar (2010), Mcneill (1984)
p.223), Fischer (1925), Fuller (1998), and Ropp (1959 p.161). In terms of technology, political scientists have
previously emphasized the importance of railroads for military mobilization, but in doing so they have focused
above all on the e¤ect of rail transport on the o¤ense-defense balance. See in particular Fearon (1997), Sagan
(1986), Shimshoni (1990), van Evera (1984), Snyder (1984), and Jervis (1978).
7Brodie (1946).
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In our empirical tests we also take account of several alternative hypotheses. The most
prominent of these is the idea that the French Revolution and the invention of the concept of
"the nation in arms" constituted a structural break. After this date, or so its proponents would
suggest, it was possible to mobilize armies on a scale previously thought unimaginable.8
To test our argument as well as several alternatives we have compiled a new data set that
records army sizes, levels of military mobilization (army size/total population), and recruitment
methods for thirteen great powers over the period from 1600 to 2000. We adopt the classication
of great powers rst proposed by Jack Levy (1983). Our army size data derives from the
Correlates of War data set for the period since 1815. For the period between 1600 and 1815
we have constructed measures of army size by referring to a wide range of historical sources, all
of which are listed in the appendix to this paper. When combined with available estimates of
population, these also allow us to construct mobilization levels for this period.
In order to test our hypothesis about the impact of shifts in communications and transport
technology, we rst propose an indirect test and then a more direct test. Using a pooled regres-
sion that includes country xed e¤ects, we regress either military size or military mobilization
on an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 beginning in 1859, the rst year that railways
were used in a major way in combat, as well as on an indicator variable that takes a value of
1 beginning in 1970, a threshold year in the development of cruise missile technology. Finally,
the regressions also include an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 beginning in 1789. This
tests the alternative hypothesis that the invention of the idea of the nation in armsled to an
increase in army size and mobilization levels.
When we use either military size or military mobilization as a dependent variable, we ob-
serve, consistent with our core hypothesis, that the year 1859 was associated with a large and
statistically signicant shift upward in both of these dependent variables, whereas the year 1970
was associated with a shift downward in both of these variables. In contrast, there is no evidence
in our pooled regressions that the year 1789 was associated with a statistically signicant shift
upward in either army sizes or levels of mobilization.
8This argument is particularly prominent among political scientists including Posen (1993), Snyder (2000),
Cederman, Sornette, and Warren (2011), Fearon (1997), Van Evera (1998), and Walt (1992). Specialists in
military a¤airs who emphasize this point include Cohen (1996), Mahnken (2011), Liddell Hart (1954), Krepinivich
(2002), and of course Clausewitz (1832).
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Given the results of the indirect test of our transport and communications hypothesis, we
also propose a more direct test. To do so we augment the previously described regressions by
including a variable measuring the number of kilometers of railway existing in a given country
in a given year and a variable indicating whether or not a country has acquired cruise missiles
in a given year. We also add control variables for population, GDP per capita, nationalism,
political regime, and state institutions. We model unobserved time e¤ects through either a
common or country-specic linear time trend. We nd in these estimates that the extent of
a countrys railway network is signicantly positively correlated with the magnitude of mili-
tary mobilization while the presence of cruise missiles is signicantly negatively correlated with
mobilization. Importantly, we also observe that when these variables are introduced into the
regression, our indicator variables for post-1859 and post-1970 years are no longer statistically
signicant, and each coe¢ cient drops substantially in magnitude. We show that these results
are robust to changes in the covariate prole, operationalization of key variables, and functional
form assumptions. For the railroad results, we also show that the estimates are robust to ex-
panding the sample beyond great power countries and to changing the sample period. We also
explore di¤erence-in-di¤erence comparisons within a country by looking at di¤erences in navy
and army growth in the UK before and after railroads became widely used for military pur-
poses. Taken together, these analyses provide strong evidence for the importance of the railroad
in ushering in the era of the mass army. Though our results for cruise missiles are subject to
more caveats, our results here are nonetheless consistent with the view that communications and
technology advances in the second half of the 20th century led countries to eld substantially
smaller forces in their conicts. Finally, our pooled analysis further explores the role of nation-
alism by exploiting the idea that states nd it di¢ cult to instill national loyalties before the
introduction of mass schooling (Darden, forthcoming) and adopting literacy rates as a proxy for
nationalism. We do not nd evidence of a positive partial correlation betwen literacy rates and
either of our measures of mobilization. This result is consistent with the lack of a break point
in either series near 1789. Although our pooled results do not suggest a large and early role for
nationalism in bringing about the era of mass warfare, our evidence on this point is somewhat
indirect. Moreover, we present evidence of a positive interaction between our nationalism and
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railroad measure. This nding is consistent with the idea that nationalism played a role in
making citizens willing to ght but it was only after the railroad made large armies feasible did
it have a signicant e¤ect on mobilization.
We refrain from suggesting that the observed correlation between railroad networks and
army size is denitive evidence of the precise causal mechanism that we have in mind. An
alternative might be that states that wanted to have large armies also built extensive railroad
networks whereas states that chose not to have large armies refrained from building extensive
railway networks. If this was the case then it would imply that in a regression of army size
(or mobilization) on railroad network size, we would get a biased estimate of the true e¤ect of
the latter on the former. In what follows, however, we present evidence from Bogart (2009)
to show that the coe¢ cients on the measures we use for kilometers of railway are unlikely
to be biased in this manner. The key reason is that governments that anticipated military
conict tended to nationalize railways, inuence their management, and inuence choices of
where to locate railway lines, but with a few notable exceptions, governments did not build
more kilometers of railway in anticipation of conict. This provides a further important reason
for using our railroad kilometers measure as opposed to an alternative variable that might
also take into account further characteristics of a railroad network such as its organization and
degree of centralized control. We should acknowledge, however, that we have no such assurance
of plausible exogeneity for our cruise missile tests.
In addition to our pooled analyses, we also discuss the history of French mobilization in
greater depth. We focus on France because it is the case that has most informed the thinking
of many scholars about the evolution of mass armies and their political determinants. Our
discussion of France suggests that even in this case, it is clear that the magnitude of the inuence
of the French Revolution and Napoleonic era on army size and mobilization was relatively small
and the era of the mass army was a late 19th and 20th century phenomenon that coincided with
and depended on the technological innovations of the industrial revolution.
Finally, we also consider the methods through which armies were recruited in the period
between 1600 and 2000. It is common to see universal conscription as an invention that made
the mass army possible. We will argue below that the evidence on military recruitment actually
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ts more closely with our alternative, technology based interpretation. The causal chain may
actually lead from technological change, to universal conscription, to the emergence of mass
armies. More recent technological change may have had the exact opposite development. Our
regression results are consistent with the former claim, though the evidence for the latter is
somewhat weaker.
In the remainder of this paper, we proceed as follows. Section 2 outlines our argument
that changes in communications and transport technology, and in particular the invention of
the railroad, constituted the most important factor in ushering in an era of mass warfare. In
Section 3 we consider alternative explanations. In Section 4, we present a new comparative
data set on the size of the military in thirteen great power countries from 1600 to 2000, and we
also consider the methods by which these armies were recruited. Section 5 then presents our
empirical evaluation of our argument and Section 6 considers the French case in greater detail.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Technology and the Mass Army
The core question we ask in this paper is what factors have led the great powers to eld mass
armies. Since we are examining a long stretch of history, there are undoubtedly multiple factors
that have been at play, and below we will discuss those that have been most heavily emphasized
in previous scholarship. Before doing so, however, we will emphasize a further argument -
changes in technologies for transport and communications have governed the size of armies that
it has been feasible and desirable to mobilize.
In the rst instance, elding a mass army depends on the ability of a state to recruit a
su¢ ciently large set of individuals. It also depends on two further factors. First, a state must
have the ability to actually deploy troops and to keep them supplied. Second, a state that has
the ability to recruit a mass army must also prefer this format of military force to one in which
a more limited number of individuals serve. In what follows we will argue that prior to the
invention of the railroad, it was physically impossible for states to eld armies numbering in
the millions. Even had it been possible to raise, transport, and support an army of this size,
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before the invention of the telegraph and telephone, it would have been extremely di¢ cult to
exercise command. It was thus the application of the inventions of the industrial revolution
that allowed a broad set of states for the rst time to eld armies representing up to 10% of their
total population. We will then argue that over recent decades, further developments in transport
and communications technology have pushed in the opposite direction. As was recognized (and
feared) by Soviet military planners as early as the 1970s, in an environment where weapons can
be targeted remotely and with increased precision, a mass army may be increasingly obsolete.
2.1 A First Revolution - Transporting Men by Railway
Prior to the adoption of the railway for military purposes, it was possible in theory for a state
to recruit a mass army, but elding it faced several very signicant obstacles.9 While the
soldiers of a mass army could transport themselves by marching to the eld of battle, once
there they needed to be commanded by some means. In addition, any munitions required for
the army needed to be transported. Finally, a mass army men and horses needed to be fed.
Since antiquity, armies had most often met this last requirement by foraging. But this strategy
depended upon the carrying capacity of the land in question. By the eighteenth century the
widespread adoption of the potato in Europe had increased the number of calories that could be
extracted from a typical plot of agricultural land, but there remained serious limitations on the
ability of a very large army, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, to feed itself via either
feeding o¤ the land or bringing supplies from the rear via wagon. Napoleons armies built a
reputation for moving quickly. One of the reasons they had to move quickly was that otherwise
they would have starved after exhausting all nearby resources.10 Prior to the invention of the
railway, an army numbering in the millions would have starved in short order.
The rst modern railway was made feasible by the merging of an old technology the concept
of moving goods on rails together with the principal invention of the industrial revolution the
steam engine. First envisioned at the outset of the nineteenth century, it was not until several
decades later that trains capable of carrying passengers were rst developed, and several decades
9This section draws on the studies by Pratt (1915), van Creveld (1977, 1989), Westwood (1980), Fischer (1925),
Fuller (1998), and Wolmar (2010).
10See van Creveld (1977) on this point.
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after that before railways could carry large number of passengers and freight.11 Although
railways were used in the Crimean war, the authoritative account by Pratt (1915) suggests that
the rst time they were used in a signicant manner was by France during the Italian campaign
of 1859. Subsequently, railways played a crucial role in both the American Civil War and the
Franco-Prussian War, and of course in World War I. A contemporary observation from 1918
sums up one opinion on the importance of the railway.
What Napoleon would have done if the railroad and motor-truck had been in
existence in his day appalls the imagination. His battles were fought with armies
which today seem triing - sixty-two thousand men at Austerlitz; not many more
than that at Waterloo. It does not seem to be generally realized that the real reason
for the scope of battles nowadays is simply the locomotive. Foch and Hindenburg
count their troops by the millions, where Napoleon and Blucher counted theirs by
ten thousands, because the steam engine has made it possible to transport and feed
a hundred men today as easily as one man a hundred years ago. The new style of
warfare is essentially a product, not of trenches, or machine guns, or artillery, but of
railroads (Bellows, 1918).
We do recognize that the substantial increase in army size during the second half of the
19th century was made possible by railroads but also made substantially more desirable by
the development of the telegraph and widespread use of breach-loading ries. Further, the
invention of the internal combustion engine radically changed how the wars of the rst half
of the 20th century were fought. However, in many ways, this innovation, as important as it
was, largely amplied the e¤ects of the railroad. Moving and supplying large armies became
even more feasible and more desirable. Thus, our focus on railroads and technologies for remote
delivery seeks to highlight what are in our view the two most important technological innovations
inuencing the use of mass armies, but our larger argument emphasizes the general importance
of technological change in understanding long run trends in the format of military force.
11See Mokyr (1990) for a discussion of some of these innovations and the obstacles faced.
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2.2 A Second Revolution: Remote Delivery of Explosive Force
Though late nineteenth century advances in transport and communications technologies removed
the obstacles to elding a mass army, there is no reason to necessarily believe that each new
advance in this area has led to, or will lead to, the mobilization of ever greater numbers of
individuals. The key reason is that if improvements in transport can make it easier to move
soldiers to the eld of battle, they can also make it easier to deliver and target explosive force
from areas withdrawn from the actual eld of battle. A wide variety of new technologies have
emerged that can allow remote delivery of explosive force and often with great precision. These
include the gyroscope, the radar, the laser, and the satellite.12 What are the implications of
remote delivery of explosive force for levels of mobilization? To quote Major Leonard Litton of
the US Air Force, in this era of new weaponry
It is no longer required to bring forces into the same geographical area to bring their
e¤ects to bear on the same target and, in fact, on the modern battleeld it may be
dangerous as well (Litton 2000, 3).
In other words, there may be a straightforward technological explanation suggesting why
the era of the mass army is now over. Interestingly, while certain US military planners have
advocated the idea that new technologies allow for maintaining the same defensive capability
with far fewer men, it was actually Soviet military planners who rst highlighted this possibility.
Evidence shows that from the late 1970s Soviet planners grew fearful that US advances in the
area of precision weapons would render inoperable the principal Soviet war plan which involved
quickly pushing a mass army westwards across the European continent.13
2.3 Predicted E¤ects of The Two Revolutions
We have laid out an argument suggesting that advances in communications and transport tech-
nology, a result of the industrial revolution, helped allow states to mobilize mass armies on a
12See the contributions by Krepinevich (2002) and Murray and Knox (2001) for discussions of how precision
weapons can alter incentives to mobilize mass armies. One should also certainly mention for more recent years
the additional technologies for drone airplanes.
13See Murray and Knox (2001) on this point.
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scale not previously possible. We then suggested how subsequent advances in communications
and transport technology have pushed states in the opposite direction by facilitating the remote
delivery of explosive force. The implication then is that after a century long period during
which technology favored the development of mass armies, the major powers in more recent
decades have begun to mobilize smaller armies that in size bear more resemblance to those of
the pre-industrial era. There are three observable implications of this argument.
First, in absolute terms we should expect to observe that armies grew larger in size as
countries developed railroad networks to transport both men and the materials to keep them
supplied. We should likewise expect that as countries gained access to new technologies allowing
them to deliver explosive force at a distance and with precision, then armies shrank in size.
Second, we should also expect to observe that as railroad networks expanded, countries were
able to mobilize a larger fraction of their overall population. Likewise, the arrival of precision
weapons should lead to lower levels of mobilization.
Finally, we might also expect technological change to inuence the way in which states recruit
their armies. Since the time of Sidgwick (1883) it has been suggested that very large armies
will need to be recruited by conscription, which is equivalent to a tax in kind.14 The reason is
that paying each member of a very large army a market wage would require a level of taxation
so high as to impose major deadweight costs on the economy. If this is the case, then we should
expect the arrival of the railroad to be associated with a shift to recruitment by conscription and
the arrival of precision weapons to increase the likelihood of states reestablishing a professional
army. A key feature of this argument is that it applies to conscription regimes in general
and not exclusively to regimes of universal conscription. Sidgwick actually believed that social
welfare would be maximized with a conscription regime in which those who could earn high
incomes in the market economy should be exempted from service. An alternative variant of this
prediction regarding recruitment would suggest that the two technological revolutions to which
we have referred had their most noticeable impact on the tendency of states to adopt universal
conscription, and not necessarily conscription of any form. For the reasons identied by Levi
(1997), if individuals are more likely to contribute to a collective project when they believe that
14See Ross (1994) for a formal treatment of this problem.
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all will contribute, then a system of universal conscription is the optimal method for raising a
very large army. For this reason we might expect the arrival of the railroad to be associated
with a shift to universal conscription and the arrival of precision weapons to be associated with
a shift away from this system of recruitment.
3 Alternative and Complementary Explanations
3.1 State Capacity
The need to raise revenues, which depends on administrative capacity to raise them, is a con-
straint that has without a doubt inuenced the size of armies that states can mobilize. Recruiting
volunteer soldiers is easier the better they are paid. Compliance with conscription is also im-
proved with better pay and conditions for soldiers. And, of course, the use of foreign mercenaries
depends almost entirely on having revenues available to pay them. Finally, for states to want to
raise large armies, they also need to have revenue to arm and supply them. The e¤ectiveness of
countries in raising revenue is primarily determined by their wealth and by the transactions costs
that rulers face in raising revenue. The importance of national income and wealth for raising
revenues and for sovereign borrowing is obvious. Economic resources, however, do not auto-
matically make themselves available to the state. In the rst instance raising resources depends
on the development of e¤ective bureaucratic institutions of the sort described by James Tracy
(1985) for the Netherlands in the sixteenth century and by John Brewer (1988) for the United
Kingdom in the eighteenth century. It is di¢ cult to measure the e¤ectiveness of bureaucratic
institutions of this sort on a comparative basis and particularly over such a long time period.
One option, which we will pursue, is to simply assume that state capacity is correlated with per
capita income, a point made abundantly clear by Besley and Persson (2011). A second option,
which we will also pursue, is to use the established ability of a state to conduct a national census
as a proxy for bureaucratic capacity.
11
3.2 Political Rights
Another alternative hypothesis involves the role of political rights and their association with
both the willingness of citizens to ght and the ability of a state to nance a war. Historically,
mobilization of a signicant share of a countrys population for war has often occurred in a
context where those who ght are granted new rights that place them on an equal footing
with other groups in society.15 At the most basic level this would involve being considered a
citizen, and at a further level sharing the same rights for voting, representation, and political
expression as others. However, mobilization of all does not necessarily have to be associated
with a democratic form of government. What it instead implies is that all enjoy the same rights
of citizenship and political participation, however extensive or restricted they may be.
At rst glance, the equalization of rights has seemed to be a powerful force in enabling states
to raise large armies and mobilize a signicant share of their populations to ght. In France in
the 1790s those who fought were operating in an environment in which privileges long held by
nobles had recently been abolished. Similarly, a handful of countries adopted universal su¤rage
in the context of World War I. Even China provides an example, as in the 1940s those who
fought for the Peoples Liberation Army were operating in a context in which privileges of a
landlord class had been abolished via extensive land reform.16 In our empirical analysis we
focus on examining the impact of the extension of voting rights and competitive elections on
army size, rates of citizen mobilization, and methods of recruitment.
In addition to focusing on the relationship between democracy and mass mobilization, we
can also focus on an earlier set of political rights that many have suggested were associated with
the ability to raise revenues and loans for wars. Before the advent of universal su¤rage, it was
common for European states to have representative assemblies in which a more limited set of
citizens could exert inuence over policy. At a basic level, a representative assembly could serve
as a venue in which a ruler sought citizen consent for taxation, a mechanism that Levi (1988)
and previously Sidgwick (1903) suggest allowed for raising more revenue than if a ruler simply
15This is in fact a very old argument. The earliest known exposition of this claim is in the Pseudo-Xenophons
text "The Constitution of the Athenians", presumed to date from the 5th Century B.C. See Levi (1997) for a
discussion of the link between citizenship and conscription in modern times and also Ticchi and Vindigni (2008)
for a formal exposition.
16See Gittings (1967).
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tried to levy taxes without seeking consent. At a second level, a representative assembly could
also be given prerogatives over the management of spending, a feature that might make citizens
more willing to consent to taxation, as well as more willing to lend if they anticipated that this
increased a states creditworthiness.17 We can investigate both of these possibilities using the
variables coded and collected by Stasavage (2010, 2011) and extended to several other cases.
3.3 Nationalism
Finally, there is little doubt that nationalism has been a potent force for states seeking to
mobilize their citizens for war. The key question is how important nationalism has been relative
to the other factors that have inuenced army sizes and the intensity of mobilization. Those
who emphasize the importance of nationalism refer to the French Revolution as a key watershed.
By inventing the idea of the nation in arms, the French revolutionaries, it is said, ushered in an
era where conict took on a new intensity and scale. In the words of Jack Snyder,
The wars of the French Revolution (1792-1802) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815)
revealed for the rst time in history the full potential of belligerent mass nationalism
(2000 p.154).
Among other scholars, Cederman, Sornette, and Warren (2011) present the most recent
argument in this vein. They emphasize nationalism as an essentially exogenous force. Posen
(1993) in contrast suggests that nationalism emerged endogenously as states in competition
needed to motivate their populations. However, he shares the same emphasis on the French
Revolution as a break point. According to this account, the critical turning point occurred
during 1793 when the French revolutionaries rst declared a levée en masse, applying the idea
that anyone could be obliged to serve in order to defend France against encroaching armies.
What is less often recognized by many scholars is that the levée en masse was actually a one o¤
policy adopted during a period of particularly acute danger from invasion. Moreover, while it is
clear that revolutionaries in Paris spoke of the importance of the nation in their public speeches,
those careful studies that exist of the levée en masse at the local level do not reect the same
17An idea most directly associated with North and Weingast (1989).
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degree of patriotic fervor.18 Finally, contrary to what is sometimes presumed, Napoleon actually
abandoned the levée en masse as a method of recruitment. He instead used a more traditional
system of conscription in which the wealthy could purchase a replacement.19
The idea that the French Revolution was a structural break provides one feasible, although
certainly imperfect, way of examining the nationalism hypothesis. We can do so rst of all
by looking at all of the powers in our sample and examining whether both army sizes and
levels of mobilization noticeably increased after 1789, and if so by how much. The idea here
would be that while France pioneered the use of nationalism, other European powers were
soon obliged to follow suit. For example, Linda Colley (1994) has argued that the wars of
the revolutionary and Napoleonic period saw a new sense of nation appear in Great Britain.
William McNeil (1982), among others, argues that nationalistic fervor played an important role
in Prussias rearmament in 1813-1814. A second way of examining the nationalism hypothesis
is to examine the partial correlations between an indicator of nationalism and our dependent
variables. Darden (forthcoming) argues that modern states nd it di¢ cult to instill national
loyalties until the introduction of mass schooling. It takes a literate population educated by the
state for countries to develop strong nationalist identities that inuence political behavior. We
investigate this hypothesis by using literacy rates as a proxy for nationalism.20 A third way in
which we can examine the nationalism hypothesis is to look at a time series for France alone
to examine to what extent the French Revolution appears as a structural break in the data on
army sizes and mobilization ratios.
If we fail to nd evidence that nationalism inuenced army sizes or mobilization ratios,
we will still want to consider the possibility of an interaction e¤ect between the nationalism
hypothesis and our own. It may have been the case that nationalism constituted a powerful
force for motivating citizens, but until the invention of the railroad there was a technologically
imposed ceiling on the size of an army that could actually be elded and supplied. It may have
been the case, as suggested by J.F.C. Fuller (1998) with reference to the railroads inventor
18See Gagniage (1996) for an excellent example.
19Pigeard (2003) provides the most authoritative recent study on conscription during the Napoleonic era.
20Alternatively, any observed partial correlation between literacy and military size or mobilization may indicate
state investments in education and the military to respond to security threats (Aghion, Persson, and Rouzet
2012).
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"Thus it came about that the genius of George Stephenson (1781-1848) gave life to
the Clausewitzian theory of the nation in arms."21
4 War Mobilization in Great Power States, 1600-2000
4.1 Army Size and Mobilization Levels
To assess what factors determine the scale of warfare and the extent of citizen participation in
war, we have constructed a data set recording the size of the military and the extent of population
mobilization for great power states from 1600 to 2000. We adopt Levys (1983) denition of a
great power as a state that plays a major role in international politics with respect to security-
related issues(p. 16), and we adopt his coding of great powers. Levy identies thirteen states
that were great powers during some portion of the 1600 to 2000 period.
The key variable in the data set isMilitary Size which is dened as troops under the command
of the national government and intended for use against foreign adversaries. It is measured in
thousands. This denition does not include reserve troops, colonial troops, civil defense units,
and domestic police forces. A common problem with statistics on the size of the military is that
states have an incentive to inate them. We made e¤orts to use numbers that reect actual
or e¤ective forces rather than paper forces wherever possible. The appendix of this paper
provides a complete discussion of the sources that we used to construct our data as well as full
citations for these sources.
Military Size measures the absolute magnitude of great power forces. We are also interested
in the extent to which citizens in these countries are mobilized for war, and so we have con-
structed the variable Military Mobilization, equal to military size divided by total population,
to measure citizen participation. In addition to the distinction between actualand paper
forces, it is important to keep in mind variation over time and across countries in the extent
of the use of foreign troops. Ideally, our data for this measure would clearly separate domestic
21The three alternative factors discussed here do not, of course, exhaust the potential factors inuencing military
mobilization. Fertility rates and demography trends are also likely to matter and our analysis will control for
population size. Other factors which may inuence military mobilization but are di¢ cult to measure directly
include di¤erences in the stakes and scope of various conicts and improvements in food preservation and disease
prevention. Our analysis will use a number of alternative strategies to limit potential bias due to these and other
unobserved factors.
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Figure 1: Mobilization in Great Powers, 1600-2000, Panel A. See text and appendix for sources.
and foreign troops. While we have a good deal of information about the recruitment patterns of
each state and will discuss these in the next subsection, it is not possible to separate out foreign
troops for the full data set. Instead, we will be careful throughout the paper to consider how
the presence of foreign troops may inuence our interpretation of the main factors determining
variation in the size of military forces and the extent of mobilization.
Figures 1 and 2 present our data for Military Size and Military Mobilization for each of the
thirteen sample countries during the years for which they were great powers. For each country,
the plot with lled-in circles records the overall size of the military in thousands (left y-axis)
and the plot with hollowed diamonds records mobilization levels (right y-axis). In interpreting
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Figure 2: Mobilization in Great Powers, 1600-2000, Panel B. See text and appendix for sources.
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these graphs, it is important to keep in mind a few basic patterns in the data. First, annual
data is generally available only for observations after the resolution of the Napoleonic Wars in
1815. Secondly, the incidence of war is greater in earlier periods than later periods.22 Third,
these two facts interact in that data on war mobilization in the 17th and 18th centuries are
more likely to be observed in war years. Given these patterns, as well as our substantive interest
in war mobilization as opposed to the size of peacetime armies, in our statistical tests, we will
focus our attention on the patterns of military size and mobilization during years in which these
states are engaged in conicts.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics forMilitary Size andMilitary Mobilization for war years
by century. The table along with Figures 1 and 2 highlights the most striking feature of our
data: mass mobilized warfare reached an entirely new scale in the rst half of the 20th century.
The average for military size almost doubles from the 17th to the 18th century, it almost triples
from the 18th to the 19th century, and then increases by a factor of 5.7 from the 19th to the 20th
century. The averages for Military Mobilization are perhaps even more striking in highlighting
the uniqueness of the 20th century. The 17th, 18th, and 19th century average mobilization levels
are not that di¤erent from each other but average mobilization doubles from 0.017 in the 19th
century to 0.034 in the 20th century. Figures 1 and 2 suggest that unsurprisingly these patterns
are primarily driven by World War I and World War II. Although one might be worried that
these averages are driven by di¤erences across centuries in the propensity to ght wars and do
not reect the main events of international politics, for military size, the maximum values of the
variable increase at quite similar rates as the averages (increasing by a factor of 2.02, 2.72, and
6.25 across each century).
At rst glance, the maximum values for military mobilization rates appear to follow a dif-
ferent pattern but this is not very informative because the key gure that is out of place is the
maximum of 0.19 for Military Mobilization in the 17th century. This is the value for Sweden
in 1632 and it is a true outlier for the century (the next closest value is 0.056). Further, as we
discuss below, this value is inated by the heavy use of foreign troops. That said, there is a
clear pattern of high mobilization rates with relatively small armies for small states like Sweden
22Using data primarily from Levy (1983) and the Correlates of War (2010), we found that 65%, 60%, 25%, and
23% of great power years involve wars in the 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th century respectively.
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Standard
Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
17th Century
Military Size 69 95.370 62.225 13.000 362.000
Military Mobilization 69 0.018 0.025 0.002 0.190
18th Century
Military Size 152 179.559 102.351 12.725 732.474
Military Mobilization 152 0.016 0.011 0.002 0.082
19th Century
Military Size 80 481.516 324.011 11.134 2000.000
Military Mobilization 80 0.017 0.009 0.002 0.054
20th Century
Military Size 142 2762.583 2546.014 125.923 12500.000
Military Mobilization 142 0.034 0.036 0.002 0.161
Table 1: Military Size and Mobilization by Century (in thousands). This table reports descriptive
statistics for Military Size and Military Mobilization for each in year in which a great power in
our sample is at war.
and Netherlands in 17th century and even somewhat larger states such as Prussia in the middle
of the 18th century. Nevertheless, in the data set overall, Sweden 1632 is the only point in the
top twenty mobilization rates that is not from the twentieth century. This descriptive evidence
is suggestive of a clear break in the size of military forces and the extent of citizen participation
in the twentieth century, a pattern we will probe in much greater detail below.
4.2 Recruitment Methods
In order to better understand changes in the format of military force over time, it also makes
sense to consider how armies were recruited. We argued above that the invention of the railroad
helped lead to a shift towards universal conscription in which members of the middle classes
would be expected to serve in great numbers. This is a hypothesis that we will test formally
below, but rst it is worth presenting the evidence in more descriptive fashion.
Using a variety of di¤erent sources, we have been able to provide a sketch of the evolution
of recruitment practices over time across the thirteen great powers. Each country is considered
19
only for the period in which it was classied as a great power following the classication by Levy
(1983). The results of this exercise are presented in Table 2. In this table we code a country as
having had a system of conscription if there was a system by which central authorities determined
how many individuals would be obliged to serve, how many from each region or locality, and if
central authorities also established a rule (most commonly a lottery) through which individuals
would be chosen. Situations where central authorities implicitly or explicitly sanctioned the
use of force by local recruiters but did not establish a procedure for selection do not count as
conscription according to this rule. In Table 2 we also identify the date at which a system of
conscription became universal. Since no system of conscription is ever truly universal, it is also
worth detailing how we arrived at this classication. By universal here we are referring to a
system in which there are no explicit exemptions for those owning property and no possibilities
for purchasing a replacement. However, according to the denition we have adopted a system
of universal conscription might still have exemptions for age and educational deferments.
What conclusions can we draw from the evidence in Table 2? A rst observation is that
conscription of the non-universal variant developed quite early in a number of states, and in fact
well before the French Revolution. This would seem to go against the arguments of Sidgwick
(1883) and Ross (1994) who propose a causal chain running from army size, to deadweight
costs, to choice of recruitment regime, unless of course the tax mechanisms used by earlier states
were much more distortionary. At an earliest stage of development, recruitment tended to be
decentralized and ad hoc, potentially reecting weak central state capacity. Central authorities
would give either army captains or local authorities the responsibility for recruiting a set number
of individuals within a specic region. Army captains or local authorities then had considerable
discretion in deciding what types of individuals would be recruited and what conditions would
be o¤ered in exchange for service. Over time, a number of states shifted toward a system of
conscription in which a set number of individuals from each region had an obligation to serve,
and central authorities specied the rule according to which individuals would be chosen. This
was the case with the French system of militia recruitment from a very early date.
A second observation is that with the notable exception of Prussia, it was not until late into
the nineteenth century, a period corresponding to the rst military uses of the railroad, that one
20
G
re
at
p
ow
er
?
C
on
sc
ri
p
ti
on
?
U
n
iv
er
sa
l?
F
or
ei
gn
5
0%
?
S
ou
rc
es
A
us
tr
ia
16
00
-1
91
8
17
71
-1
91
8
18
68
no
D
u¤
y
(1
97
7)
C
ox
e
(1
82
0)
R
ot
he
nb
ur
g
(1
98
2)
C
hi
na
19
49
-2
00
0
19
53
-2
00
0
19
53
no
G
it
ti
ng
s
(1
96
7)
C
he
ng
(2
00
7)
Fr
an
ce
16
00
-2
00
0
16
36
-2
00
02
3
17
93
-4
,
19
05
no
L
yn
n
(1
99
7)
Fo
rr
es
t
(1
98
9)
C
ré
pi
n
(2
00
9)
It
al
y
18
61
-1
94
3
18
61
-1
94
3
19
07
no
P
ra
sa
d
an
d
Sm
yt
he
(1
96
8)
Ja
pa
n
19
05
-1
94
5
19
05
-1
94
5
18
73
no
O
ga
w
a
(1
92
1)
H
un
te
r
(1
98
4)
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
16
09
-1
71
3
no
ne
ve
r
ye
s
va
n
N
im
w
eg
en
(2
00
9)
O
tt
om
an
E
m
pi
re
16
00
-1
69
9
16
00
-1
66
6
ne
ve
r
no
A
ks
an
(1
99
9,
20
07
)
M
ur
ph
ey
(1
99
9)
P
ru
ss
ia
17
40
-2
00
0
17
40
-2
00
02
4
18
13
no
W
ils
on
(2
00
0)
W
al
te
r
(2
00
9)
R
us
si
a
17
21
-2
00
0
17
21
-2
00
0
18
74
no
D
u¤
y
(1
98
1)
W
ild
m
an
(1
98
0)
Sp
ai
n
16
00
-1
80
8
16
30
-1
64
5,
17
04
-1
77
6
ne
ve
r
no
M
ac
ka
y
(1
99
9)
P
ar
ke
r
(1
97
2)
B
la
ck
(2
00
7)
Sw
ed
en
16
17
-1
72
1
16
17
-1
68
2
ne
ve
r
ye
s
b
ef
or
e
16
60
A
b
er
g
(1
97
3)
R
ob
er
ts
(1
97
9)
V
ill
st
ra
nd
(2
00
0)
U
ni
te
d
K
in
gd
om
16
00
-2
00
0
19
16
-1
91
8,
19
39
-1
96
0
19
16
no
C
lo
de
(1
86
9)
M
cc
ra
ni
e
(2
00
9)
G
at
es
(1
99
6)
U
ni
te
d
St
at
es
18
98
-2
00
0
19
17
-1
8,
19
40
-7
3
19
17
no
P
ra
sa
d
an
d
Sm
yt
he
(1
96
8)
T
ab
le
2:
M
ili
ta
ry
R
ec
ru
it
m
en
t.
Fu
ll
re
fe
re
nc
es
fo
r
th
e
so
ur
ce
s
ca
n
b
e
fo
un
d
at
th
e
en
d
of
th
e
da
ta
ap
p
en
di
x.
C
on
sc
ri
pt
io
n
w
as
pr
ac
ti
ce
d
so
m
ew
ha
t
ir
re
gu
la
rl
y
in
F
ra
nc
e
du
ri
ng
th
e
17
th
ce
nt
ur
y
sp
ec
i
ca
lly
in
16
36
,
16
43
-4
4,
16
74
,
an
d
16
88
-9
7.
A
ft
er
st
ar
ti
ng
ag
ai
n
in
17
03
,
it
w
as
in
te
rr
up
te
d
du
ri
ng
a
fe
w
la
te
r
p
er
io
ds
in
cl
ud
in
g
17
16
-1
72
5
an
d
18
15
-1
81
7.
C
on
sc
ri
pt
io
n
w
as
in
te
rr
up
te
d
fo
r
G
er
m
an
y
b
et
w
ee
n
19
19
an
d
19
34
,
as
w
el
l
as
b
et
w
ee
n
19
46
an
d
19
58
.
21
can begin to speak of the emergence of truly universal conscription in Europe. This suggests
that the causal chain may in fact run from the introduction of the railroad, to an increase in
army size, and thus an incentive to make conscription universal. It is generally known that
European powers initially adopted conscription systems that provided the middle classes and
the rich with substantial opportunities to escape service thanks to exemptions, opt-outs, or
possibilities for purchasing a replacement. Even in those European cases that are sometimes
o¤ered as early examples of "universal" systems of conscription, actual practice until well into
the nineteenth century involved substantial opportunities for the middle classes and the wealthy
to avoid service. In France the levée en masse of 1793 was indeed an instance where those with
wealth had few opportunities to avoid service.25 However, this was also a very brief episode.
After Thermidor and Napoleons subsequent assumption of power, France returned to a system
of conscription in which those with wealth could avoid service by purchasing replacements.26
During the course of the nineteenth century the legal opportunities for avoiding service evolved
continuously, and as documented by Crépin (2009), as late as 1905 conscription laws in France
continued to o¤er certain social groups the opportunity of avoiding service. Prussia is often
o¤ered as another case of an early shift to universal conscription beginning in 1813, and we have
used this date in Table 2.27
In addition to drawing conclusions about how soldiers were recruited, the sources listed in
Table 2 also provide us with useful information addressing the second question referred to above
- who was recruited? It seems fair to say that it was not until the late nineteenth century
that one can speak of the development of mass armies in which members of the middle and
even upper classes served alongside peasants and the urban poor. During the era of voluntary
and decentralized recruitment regimes, the most common pattern was for recruiting agents to
focus on individuals who were in su¢ ciently di¢ cult economic circumstances that even a very
poorly paid position in the army might be voluntarily chosen. Subsequent compliance was then
ensured by implementing extremely severe punishments for shirking or desertion. Another key
25See Gagniage (1996) as well as Bertaud (1988).
26The most authoritative account of the system of replacement in France can be found in Schnapper (1968).
This practice was abolished in 1872.
27 With this said, it should be noted that Walter (2009) concludes that even after this date there remained very
substantial opportunities for middle and upper income groups to avoid service.
22
feature of this era was that several states made extensive use of foreigners serving in their army.
This was the case for Spains Army of Flanders during its long campaign against the Dutch
Republic.28 It was also the case for the army of the Dutch Republic during this period as well
as for Swedens army during the Thirty Years War.29 In fact, provided that they had access
to the necessary nance, recruitment of foreigners provided states that had small populations,
such as Sweden and the Netherlands, with a means of recruiting armies of the same size as those
elded by states with much larger populations.
The evidence in Table 2 supports the core argument of this paper. Rather than the invention
of the idea of universal conscription and "the nation in arms" directly leading to the development
of mass armies, the evidence in Table 2 is more consistent with our alternative interpretation. It
was not until the invention and perfection of railroad transport that it became feasible and desir-
able to mobilize a truly mass army. Once this technologically driven transformation occurred,
states faced incentives to develop systems of universal military conscription.
5 Evaluating Explanations for Patterns of War Mobilization
The data presented in Section 4 on military size and mobilization indicate signicant variation in
the format of military force adopted by great power states. In this section, we propose a series of
empirical investigations using this data in order to evaluate our argument that the introduction
of new transport and communication technologies has been the major factor determining the
use of mass armies. We also discuss the evidence in light of the main alternative explanations
emphasized in the literature.30
28See the detailed evidence provided by Parker (1972).
29van Nimwegen (2009) cites evidence suggesting that half of Dutch forces were foreigners. Roberts (1979)
estimates that in several key battles toward the end of the Thirty Years War, over four fths of the forces under
Swedish command were foreign.
30Although not focused on the role of transport and communication technologies, Thompson and Rasler (1999)
investigate the correlates of army size over a similarly long time period. They combine years of peace and years
of war and nd unsurprisingly that army sizes are larger in times of signicant wars. They consider technological
military revolutions generally, but they do not measure them directly and conate those that are likely to increase
and decrease army size. Our analysis is specically focused on the question of what accounts for variation in
military size and mobilization during times of war.
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5.1 Military Size and Mobilization - An Indirect Test
We start our investigation of the pooled data by examining whether key dates associated with
various arguments are correlated with changes in levels of military size and the extent of mobi-
lization, recognizing of course that other factors may have changed at the same time.
First, we investigate whether two key dates associated with innovations in transport and
communication technology are signicantly correlated with changes in observed levels of mo-
bilization. For railways, we set the date at 1859, the year proposed by Pratt (1915) in which
railways were rst used in a signicant way in military conict. This date corresponds quite
closely with the introduction of the Pullman sleeping car, which occurred in 1857. While troops
at this time certainly traveled in considerably less luxurious conditions than Pullman sleepers,
this is nonetheless a good indication that railway technology was undergoing a very rapid ad-
vance. There are a number of plausible alternative dates for innovations which dramatically
improved the remote delivery of explosive force. One possibility is to focus on the role of
precision-guided weapons. For this innovation, we set the date at 1970 to correspond to the
development of modern cruise missiles. Although the United States developed an early version
of a cruise missile in 1954 and the USSR did so in 1956,31 it was not until the late 1960s that
fully operational and e¤ective cruise missiles were a viable option to military planners.32 We
also considered focusing on the role of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) in expanding
the remote delivery of explosive force. The rst operational ICBM was in 1957, and the results
discussed below are quite similar using this date rather than 1970.
As a second test, we look for evidence that the French Revolution was a structural break
consistent with the nationalism hypothesis by examining whether army size and levels of mobi-
lization noticeably increased after 1789, and if so by how much.33
31An early U.S. cruise missile was the TM-61 Matador (Huisken 1981, p.167) and an early USSR cruise missile
was the SSC-2 Kennel (Huisken 1981, p.98).
32See Werrell (1985 ch.5) for a discussion of advances in cruise missile guidance systems and the plausibility
of 1970 as a break date. It is also worth noting that this date corresponds quite closely to the rst operational
use of a laser guided bomb, which was by the United States in 1968. See Hallion (1995) for a discussion of the
development of precision guided bombs and the way in which the invention of the laser guided bomb fundamentally
changed the nature of aerial bombardment.
33 It is interesting to note that whether for English, French, or German language texts, Google Ngrams data
show a structural break upwards in the late eighteenth century for the frequency of use of the word "nation."
Moreover, in all three languages frequency of appearance of this word declined after this point.
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To test for these hypothesized breaks, we constructed three indicator variables, D1789,
D1859, and D1970, equal to 0 for all years before the year indicated and equal to 1 there-
after. The sample is all 443 country years for which we have data on military size and a great
power country is at war. In evaluating these break points, it is essential that we take into ac-
count xed unobserved factors for each state. Great powers di¤er in important ways that may
inuence their propensity to raise a large army or to mobilize a signicant proportion of their
population. Some of these di¤erences are relatively xed, having to do with the historical origins
of the states formation or its salient geographic features. To control for these determinants,
we include country xed e¤ects. Note further that our initial analysis conditions on countries
being in the sample of great powers. We are investigating the correlates of military size and
mobilization given that a country is a great power. To the extent that great power status is
determined by unobservables correlated with these break points or other variables of interest,
the results will not give good estimates of the correlates of military size and mobilization for all
types of countries. That said, some of our analyses will control for the most obvious measures
determining great power status, such as size and wealth, and we will present additional results
from a larger sample of countries. Moreover, we are primarily interested in the question of the
size of the military for the central states of the international system. Our initial evaluation of
the role of these potential structural breaks is simply xed e¤ects regressions with Military Size
and Military Mobilization as the dependent variables and the three indicator variables as the
only independent variables.
The results for these regressions are reported in column 1 of Tables 3 and 4. Table 3
provides the estimates for Military Size and Table 4 reports results for Military Mobilization.
Starting with Table 3, the coe¢ cient estimate for D1789 is -23.930 with a standard error,
adjusted for clustering by country, of 138.442.34 This indicates that there is no substantively or
statistically signicant di¤erence between the size of armies in war time before and after 1789.
The estimate for D1789 in Table 4 with Military Mobilization as the dependent variable is also
small and statistically insignicant. There is little evidence associated with a structural break
34Because the number of clusters in our sample is relatively small, we reestimated all the specications reported
in Tables 3 and 4 with robust standard errors that were not clustered on country. The clustered standard errors
were generally larger though the substantive results without clustering were consistent with the ndings with
clustered standard errors reported in the tables.
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in the adoption of larger armies at the time of the French Revolution or Napoleonic Wars. This
may be inconsistent with the nationalism hypothesis and reect the fact that European powers
had already mobilized relatively large armies for major conicts such as the War of Austrian
Succession throughout the 18th century. Alternatively, it may indicate that only France was able
to successfully construct a nationalist ideology conducive to raising signicantly larger armies
than in previous periods. We evaluate the French case in greater detail in the next section.
Finally, this test is indirect and it may be that as conservatives took power after the resolution
of the Napoleonic Wars that nationalism was no longer employed to mobilize troops and so the
coe¢ cient for D1789 is not a good indicator of the impact of nationalism. We present a more
direct test below.
Turning to the potential break point for the inuence of railroads, the coe¢ cient estimate in
column 1 of Table 3 for D1859 is 2,031 with a standard error of 545. This estimate suggests that
the great powers elded armies which were on average 2 million men larger after 1859. Similarly
the estimate in column 1 of Table 4 for D1859 is 0.021 with a standard error of 0.004. This
indicates that population mobilization was a full two percentage points higher on average during
this period. To put this in context, Table 1 indicates that the average mobilization level for the
18th century was 0.016 and so a 0.021 di¤erence is a more than doubling of mobilization rates.
These estimates clearly suggest an important structural break in military size and mobilization,
the timing of which coincides with major expansion of the railroads and the adoption of rail
transport for moving troops and military supplies.
Finally, the coe¢ cient estimates for D1970 in column 1 of both Table 3 and Table 4 are
negative and substantively and statistically signicant. The estimate in theMilitary Mobilization
regression is comparable in magnitude to that for D1859 and the estimate for Military Size is
also quite large. This suggests that the extent of mobilization after 1970 returned to levels that
looked quite similar to those before 1859. This is consistent with the hypothesized negative
e¤ect of precision weapons. This evidence, however, should be interpreted cautiously because
in addition to it being simply based on the timing of mobilization changes, there are a limited
number of wars involving great powers after 1970. Nevertheless, the descriptive evidence for
both Military Size and Military Mobilization is broadly consistent with our argument that the
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most substantial innovations in the use of mass warfare were made possible by critical changes
in transport and communications technology.35
5.2 Military Size and Mobilization - A Direct Test
The evidence that we have presented so far is essentially indirect. To more directly test the
importance of transport technology, we constructed the variable Railroad Track equal to the
length of railroad track available to the public in each country.36 Ideally we might prefer a
measure that would indicate in a precise manner how both the extent and organization of a na-
tions railway network increased the maximum army size that could be sustained, by facilitating
movement of men as well as the goods to keep them supplied. However, even if such infor-
mation was readily available for all of our sample countries, it is likely that including it would
introduce a degree of bias into our estimates. Why would this be the case? We know from the
extensive work by Bogart (2009) that governments subject to external military threats tended
to increase central state control and ownership of railway networks. However, he shows, based
on an extensive cross-country sample for the period between 1860 and 1912, that governments
which nationalized their railways actually subsequently tended to construct fewer new kilome-
ters of railway than was the case for states in which the rail network remained in private hands.
We also know from Bogarts data that the great majority of rail networks during this period
35An alternative approach to this indirect test would be to use our time series data for each individual great
power to estimate structural breakpoints using Bai and Perrons (2003) methodology. Unfortunately, our data
has two characteristics that make this approach problematic. First, there are gaps in our time series due to years
of peace. Second, for most countries, the number of war years is a relatively small number of observations.
Although we think there could be separate processes at work in determining peace-time army size, one way
to apply this approach is include all years in the analysis. The inclusion of peace years does not, however, solve
all the problems associated with conducting a structural break test of our arguments. For an individual time
series to be useful for this purpose, the country needs to be a great power continuously from the 18th century,
prior to the French Revolution, to the late 20th century. Another issue is that despite having the most complete
comparative data on military size for our time period, there is still missing data for some years prior to 1815. This
again creates gaps in the time series. Taking these two considerations into account, we were able to identify one
country for which we had a continuous time series over the relevant periods the United Kingdom for 1728-2000.
For this case, we implement Bai and Perrons (2003) algorithm for estimating optimal break points for both
Military Size and Military Mobilization. For both series, the minimum BIS segmentation suggests two break
points and the years associated with these break points are 1914 and 1954. These dates are broadly consistent
with main results of the indirect tests presented in this secton and the more general arguments of the paper.
36The original railroad track data is measured in kilometers but for Railroad Track we have divided this variable
by one millionthus the units are millions of kilometersso that the coe¢ cients for both Military Size and Military
Mobilization could be easily read. The sources for the railroad track data were Mitchell (2007a, 2007b, 2007c).
A small number of observations for the railroad measure were linearly interpolated.
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Military Size
OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D1789 -23.930 96.674
(138.442) (83.746)
0.866 0.271
D1859 2030.983 219.159
(545.037) (477.470)
0.003 0.654
D1970 -1166.186 353.256
(448.374) (339.786)
0.023 0.319
Railroad Track 43707.090 35002.650 31969.210
(11831.450) (5297.878) (2588.817)
0.003 0.000 0.000
Cruise Missile -427.278 -3689.954 -3264.737
(271.825) (637.663) (1004.757)
0.142 0.000 0.007
Population 0.013 0.023
(0.002) (0.016)
0.000 0.184
GDP per capita 0.306 0.198
(0.129) (0.163)
0.035 0.248
Literacy Quartile -78.382 -92.401
(110.424) (199.921)
0.491 0.652
Democracy -630.863 -111.130
(540.274) (367.834)
0.266 0.768
Country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Common Year Trend No No Yes No
Country-specic Year Trend No No No Yes
Number of Observations 443 443 443 443
Table 3: Military Size in Great Power Wars, 1600-2000. The table reports the results of
pooled-time-series-cross-sectional OLS regressions for the variable Military Size. The table re-
ports the coe¢ cient estimate, robust standard error clustered on country (in parentheses), and
corresponding p-value.
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Military Mobilization
OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D1789 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
0.263 0.135
D1859 0.021 0.012
(0.004) (0.004)
0.000 0.012
D1970 -0.020 -0.003
(0.006) (0.004)
0.006 0.546
Railroad Track 0.224 0.205 0.298
(0.106) (0.075) (0.111)
0.056 0.018 0.020
Cruise Missile -0.013 -0.031 -0.030
(0.003) (0.009) (0.010)
0.000 0.005 0.009
Population, Billions 0.035 -0.102
(0.041) (0.267)
0.409 0.709
GDP per capita, Thousands 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
0.425 0.841
Literacy Quartile 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.005)
0.854 0.738
Democracy 0.013 0.014
(0.005) (0.002)
0.016 0.000
Country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Common Year Trend No No Yes No
Country-specic Year Trend No No No Yes
Number of Observations 443 443 443 443
Table 4: Military Mobilization in Great Power Wars, 1600-2000. The table reports the results
of pooled-time-series-cross-sectional OLS regressions for the variable Military Mobilization.The
table reports the coe¢ cient estimate, robust standard error clustered on country (in parentheses),
and corresponding p-value.
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remained privately owned.37 At a minimum, this evidence suggests that the coe¢ cients on our
Railroad Track measure will not be subject to an upward bias attributable to the anticipation
of conict.38 In unreported specications, we nd qualitatively similar results using a measure,
Railroad Track Area, equal to railroad track kilometers divided by land area.39
In addition to our railroad track variable, to more directly test the importance of the expan-
sion of the remote delivery of explosive force, we constructed the variable Cruise Missile which
is equal to the 0 for each year before a country acquires a cruise missile and 1 for each year
after acquisition.40 We also nd qualitatively similar results using a measure indicating the
acquisition of nuclear weapons and another variable measuring the estimated count of nuclear
warheads.41
Column 2 of Tables 3 and 4, reports the results for xed e¤ects regressions which are the exact
same specication discussed for column 1 with the addition of the variables Railroad Track and
Cruise Missile. It is worth noting that inclusion of country xed e¤ects will control for any xed
component of country size. Starting with Table 3, the coe¢ cient estimate for Railroad Track is
equal to 43,707 with a standard error of 11,831 which indicates that if a country increases it rail
network by a thousand kilometers, it would on average increase the size of its army during war
time by about forty-four thousand troops. The standard deviation of Railroad Track is about
79 thousand kilometers and so a standard deviation increase in the length of track is associated
37Across his sample, in 1860 93% of railway kilometers were privately held, 82% in 1880, and 74% in 1900.
Bogarts sample includes Russia, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Italy, Austria,
Hungary, Bulgaria, Serbia, Japan, Mexico, Costa Rica, Brazil, Argentina, Germany, India Australia, and New
Zealand.
38We should also note that Donaldson (2010) makes the exact opposite assumption from us in order to propose
a means of estimating the causal impact of railway construction on economic development. He suggests that
since railroads in India were built principally for military/strategic reasons, they can be treated as exogenous for
his purposes. However, it should be noted that the railway network in India was entirely government owned and
operated, a very di¤erent situation from that which existed in Europe. Therefore, his identifying assumption can
be plausible at the same time that we make the exact opposite assumption for a di¤erent set of countries.
39More specically, the coe¢ cient estimates are all positive as hypothesized. For the mobilization dependent
variable, the estimates are statistically signcant across specications, but for the military size dependent variable,
they are less precisely estimated and not statistically signcant in all specifcations.
40For China, France, and Germany, the main source for this data is National Defense Industrial Association
(1999). For the USSR and USA, the main source is Huisken (1981). We also consulted various years of the journal
Military Balance for these two cases. For the UK, the sources are International Institute for Strategic Studies
(1974) and the National Defense Industrial Association (1999). The other great power states were not great
powers during the period of cruise missile development.
41The source for our variable measuring nuclear capability is Singh and Way (2004). The source for the
estimated nuclear warhead measure is: "Table of Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles, 1945-2002." Natural Resource
Defense Council. URL: http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab19.asp Accessed on 11 January 2012.
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with an increase in troop size of over 3 million troops. This estimate is consistent with our claim
that railroads played a decisive role in the transition to truly mass armies that numbered in the
millions. Importantly, once Railroad Track is included in the regression, the estimate for D1859
is much smaller and no longer statistically signicant. This is consistent with the idea that the
likely reason for the structural break in the series for 1859 was the increasing use of railroads in
warfare. The estimates in column 2 of Table 4 indicate a qualitatively similar story for Military
Mobilization.
The coe¢ cient estimates for Cruise Missile are negative in column 2 of Tables 3 and 4
which is consistent with the hypothesis that the capacity to deliver explosive force remotely
made large armies less desirable. Importantly, it is also the case that the estimate for D1970
is substantially attenuated and no longer statistically signicant. The coe¢ cient estimate for
Cruise Missile is only marginally statistically signicant for Military Size, but the estimate for
Military Mobilization is equal to -0.013 with a standard error of 0.003. This result suggests that
great powers mobilized over one percent less of their populations after developing cruise missiles.
Obviously, it is not likely that this full di¤erence is solely attributable to the impact of cruise
missiles as these states were developing a wide range of weapons that expanded their ability to
deliver force at a distance including nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, it is clear that the timing
of these innovations is associated with a signicant reduction in army size and mobilization.
The estimates in columns 3 and 4 in Tables 3 and 4 explore the robustness of these estimates
by adding additional control variables to the specications in columns 2 and 3. Our discussion
of alternative arguments about the determinants of army size and the extent of population
mobilization emphasized three other factors.
First, countries with greater scal capacity in terms of wealth and e¢ cient institutions for
taxation, are, all else equal, more likely to eld large armies. We constructed the variable GDP
per capita as one proxy for a states scal capacity.42 In unreported specications, we also used
a dummy variable Census recording whether a state had carried out a national census to more
42The source for this variable for all countries except the Ottoman Empire was Maddison (2003). The data were
accessed online at http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm. For the Ottoman Empire, we used estimates
from personal communication with Sevket Pamuk (see also Pamuk 2009). Missing data was linearly interpolated
for this variable. The variable used in Table 3 is in 1990 international G-K dollars. The variable is rescaled to
thousands of 1990 international G-K dollars in Table 4.
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directly proxy for administrative capacity.43
Second, states may nd it easier to raise large armies if they have extended substantial
political rights to citizens. To explore this argument we rst constructed the variable Democracy,
set equal to one if the legislature is elected in free multi-party elections, if the executive is
directly or indirectly elected in popular elections and is responsible either directly to voters or
to a legislature elected according to the rst condition, and nally if at least 50 percent of adult
males have the right to vote.44 In unreported specications we also included two variables
concerning prerogatives of representative assemblies. The dummy variable Taxes takes a value
of 1 if a state has a representative assembly that has the authority to consent to or refuse new
taxation. The dummy variable Spending takes a value of 1 if a state has a representative
assembly with the authority to exert control over expenditure decisions.45
Third, building on the idea that states nd it di¢ cult to instill national loyalties until the
introduction of mass schooling, we use literacy rates as a proxy for nationalism. The variable
Literacy Quartile is coded from 1 to 4 indicating what quartile of the adult population can
read.46 In addition to the above controls, we also add a control for the size of a countrys total
43The sources for this variable are as follows. Austria-Hungary (Encyclopedia Britannica 1911 edition), China
(Orleans, 1957), France (Insee, "Le recensement de la population dans lhistoire", Italy (Encyclopedia Britannica
1911 Edition), Japan (Eng and Smith, 1976), Netherlands (Oomens and den Bakker, 1997), Ottoman Empire
(Karpat, 1978), Prussia, Russia, Spain (Encylopedia Britannica 1911 Edition), Sweden (Hendricks, 1861), UK
(Taylor, 1951), United States (US Bureau of the Census). We report the results using GDP per capita to measure
state capacity simply because the results for the census measure were generally quite weak.
44This follows the denition used by Boix and Rosato (2001), which is a modication of the denition used by
Przeworski et al. (2000) to a context where the su¤rage may be restricted.
45The principal source for both of these variables is Stasavage (2010, 2011).
46The coding and sources for this variable are as follows: Austria-Hungary is coded a 1 for 1600-1749
and 2 for 1750-1849. It is coded a 3 for 1850-1888 and 4 for 1889-1918 based on Cipolla (1969). China
is coded 1 for 1949-1963, 2 for 1964-1981, 3 for 1982-1989, and 4 for 1990-2000. Data for 1950 and 1958
in Ross (2005); data for 1964 in Dreze and Toh (1995); and data for 1982, 1990, and 2000 from UESCO,
http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/EdStats/CHNgmrpro05b.pdf (Accessed January 2012). France is coded 1 for
1600-1749, 2 for 1750-1849, 3 for 1850-1888, and 4 for 1889-2000. For 1800 to 2000, the source for the French data
is Mironov (1991). The transition point for adult literacy in 1749 is based on a 35% literacy rate for males and
the fact that the di¤erence between male and female literacy rates later in the century is about 8-10 percentage
points. The source for the male literacy data is Stone (1969). Prussia/Germany is coded 2 for 1740-1799 based on
data from the UK, 3 for 1800-1849, and 4 for 1850-2000. The source for 1800 to 2000 is Mironov (1991). Italy is
coded 1 for 1861-1869, 2 for 1870-1899, 3 for 1900-1929, and 4 for 1930-1943. The source for this data is Tortella
(1994). Japan is coded a 4 for 1905-1945. The source is Mironov (1991) and is based on male-only data. The
Ottoman Empire is coded as a 1 for 1600-1699. Literacy in the Ottoman Empire was in the single digits in 1820
and 1870 (Pamuk, Sevket, and van Zanden 2010) and we based our coding on this fact. The Netherlands is coded
3 for 1609 to 1713 and the source is Gra¤ (1987). Russia/Soviet Union is coded 1 for 1721-1896, 2 for 1897-1925,
3 for 1926-1938, and 4 for 1939-2000 and the source is Mironov (1991). Spain is coded a 1 for 1600-1808. Literacy
was in the rst quartile in 1820 and 1870 (Pamuk, Sevket, and van Zanden 2010) and we based our coding on this
fact. Sweden is coded a 1 for 1617-1660, 2 for 1661-1685, 3 for 1686-1710, and 4 for 1711-1721. These estimates
are based on Johansson (2009). The United States is coded a 4 for 1898-2000 and the source is the National
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population. Finally, these specications include either a common or country-specic linear year
trend.
The results reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 show that the addition of control variables
results in relatively little change in our estimates of the coe¢ cient for Railroad Track. In
contrast, the addition of controls does result in a substantial change in the estimated coe¢ cients
for our Cruise Missile variable. In both columns 3 and 4 the coe¢ cient on Cruise Missile is
now statistically signicant, negative, and also much larger than in the specications without the
controls. We drew very similar conclusions about our key variables of interest in our unreported
specications that added the Census, Taxes;and Spending variables to the specication.
The results reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, which reect the addition of control
variables to our mobilization regressions, show a very similar pattern to that observed in the
previous table. The addition of the control variables has little impact on our coe¢ cient estimates
for Railroad Track. However, the addition of the control variables results in a substantially larger
negative coe¢ cient for our Cruise Missile variable. Once again, we drew very similar conclusions
in unreported specications that used alternative measures for our key independent variables
Railroad Track Area for railroad development and nuclear weapons or nuclear warhead counts
for the expansion of the remote delivery of explosive force and alternative measures of our
control variables Census, Taxes; and Spending.
The estimates for the control variables are somewhat sensitive to specication choices. For
example, in Table 3, Population and GDP per capita are positive and statistical signicant in the
specication with common year trend but not in the specication with country-specic trends.
Two results for the control variables stand out.
First, there is no evidence of a positive partial correlation between Literacy Quartile and
either dependent variable. This complements our evidence on the lack of a break point in either
series near 1789 and is consistent with our claim that nationalism may not have played as
central role in bringing about the era of mass warfare as is often argued. That said, we pursued
another possibility that is complementary to our emphasis on transportation and communication
Center for Education Statistics (1993). The United Kingdom is coded 1 for 1600-1674, 2 for 1675-1799, 3 for
1800-1869, and 4 for 1870-2000. The transition date of 1674 is based on a 45% literacy rate for males (Stone
1969) and the fact that the di¤erence between adult and male literacy rates in the 17th century were around 10
percentage points. The remainder of the series is based on data from Mironov (1991) and Tortella (1994).
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technologies. It may be the case that nationalism played a role in making citizens willing to
ght but that until the railroad and other technologies allowed mass armies to be supplied,
nationalism only had a limited e¤ect. To operationalize this idea, we added an interaction term
for Railroad Track and Literacy Quartile to the specications in cols 3 and 4 of Tables 3 and 4
with the expectation that the coe¢ cient for this interaction would be positive. Our estimates
for this interaction coe¢ cient were positive in all four specications and statistically signicant
in all cases except for the specication with Military Mobilization as the dependent variable and
country-specic time trends. This suggests that once railroad penetration was high, nationalism,
as measured by literacy rates, had a more positive e¤ect on mobilization.47 We further calculated
the marginal e¤ect of literacy at di¤erent values of railroad development and found that at high
levels of railroad development literacy has a positive and statistically signicant marginal e¤ect
on Military Size and Military Mobilization. Such an e¤ect is consistent with our argument that
although various factors such as nationalism may make it easier for states to recruit large armies,
it is only once railroad technologies are su¢ ciently developed to supply such armies that the era
of the mass army begins.48
Second, we nd some evidence that expanding political rights facilitates mobilizing popu-
lations for war. Our democracy variable is not correlated with Military Size but is positively
correlated with Military Mobilization. Moreover, in unreported specications, we nd some ev-
idence that both our Taxes and Spending variables are positively correlated with Military Size
and Military Mobilization.49
47Alternatively, it may indicate simply that states invested more in education in order to eld e¤ective mass
armies (Aghion, Persson, and Rouzet 2012).
48As suggested previously, an alternative measure of nationalism is the based on the relative frequency of
the use of the word nation using Google Ngrams data. We constructed this measure for France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom. With the caveat that we only have data for three countries, a few interesting patterns
emerge. First, the bivariate correlation coe¢ cients between the Ngram measure and the mobilization measures are
positive but of modest magnitude for France and the United Kingdom and positive and of substantial magnitude
for Germany (France: 0.095 for Military Size and 0.099 for Military Mobilization ; Prussia/Germany: 0.587 and
0.344; United Kingdom: 0.080 and 0.183). Second, if one substitutes the Ngram measure for Literacy Quartile
in the three countries for which the former measure is available, the coe¢ cient estimate for the Ngram measure
of nationalism is positive and, in some specications, statistically signicant. Our interpretation of these mixed
results is that it seems possible that nationalism has played some role in determining mobilization, but the
evidence is not particularly strong. Moreover, the overall pattern of our the ndings indicate that to the extent
nationalism did have an e¤ect, that role came later than is usually asserted.
49 In general, these results were strongest for specications with Military Mobilization as the dependent variable
and with a common year trend. We also investigated the possibility of an interaction between democracy and
our railroad measure, but we found little evidence consistent with the hypothesis.
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Our discussion of the results so far has included mention of a number of robustness checks that
focus on alternative measures of our independent variables. We also explored the robustness of
the results in a number of other ways. First, we reestimated our main specications for Military
Size in log-levels. This specication may be less sensitive to potential outlier observations.
Our main estimates for railroad Railroad Track and Cruise Missile are qualitatively the same
for these specications. Second, we reestimated our main specications for both dependent
variables with year xed e¤ects. This specication has the advantage of controlling for common
shocks, but given the small number of countries and conicts in our data in any given year, we
do not have a lot of data for this specication. We nd that the Railroad Track estimate for
Military Size is robust to this specication but not our other key coe¢ cient estimates. Third,
we added control variables for other technologies that may have played a role in allowing states
to eld larger armies. Specically, we added controls for the number of telegrams and the
number of steam and motor ships in a country in a given year.50 All of our main results are
qualitatively similar in these specications, and the estimates for these variables were mixed with
the expected positive coe¢ cient signicant in some specications. Fourth, we reestimated our
regressions for alternative samples. We were concerned that cases with high numbers of foreign
soldiers the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden prior to 1660 might be driving our results, and
so we dropped these from the analysis. We were also concerned that either World War I or
the combination of World War I and World War II might be driving the results, and dropped
these years as well. We also considered the possibility that Prussia/Germany and Russia/USSR
were cases for which the potential endogeneity of railroad development might be of strongest
concern, and so we dropped these countries individually and together. Our main ndings are
unchanged for analyses dropping the high foreign soldier cases or eliminating Prussia/Germany
or Russia/USSR.51 Similarly, dropping World War I era conicts from the analysis has no impact
on the pattern of estimates. Dropping both World War I and World War II conicts, however, is
consequential. The coe¢ cient estimates for Railroad Track are positive and generally statistically
50The source for this data is Comin and Hobijn (2009).
51The only partial exception to this pattern is that if both Prussia/Germany and Russia/USSR are dropped,
the p-value for the railroad estimate drops to 0.14 and the p-value for the cruise missile coe¢ cient drops to 0.233
in the regressions with Military Mobillization as the dependent variable, a full set of controls, and country-specic
year trends.
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signicant across specications,52 but the partial correlations between Cruise Missile and our
dependent variables disappear. Finally, we added a control variable for the extent of mobilization
by neighboring great powers to account for the possibility that army size varied in reaction to
the behavior of actual or potential enemies. The coe¢ cients estimates for Railroad Track are
positive and statistically signicant across all of these specications. The estimates for Cruise
Missile are negative in all specications with the caveat that the estimates are only marginally
statistically signicant in the Military Mobilization specications. While it is the case that
the neighbor mobilization measures are also signicantly positively correlated with mobilization
and that the inclusion of this variable somewhat attenuates the magnitude of our key coe¢ cient
estimates, it is not necessarily the case that this suggests a weaker role for the technology factors
emphasized in this paper. States certainly react to each other but the higher (lower) mobilization
rates that they are reacting to are in part chosen because of the very technological factors that
we emphasize in this paper.
Another potential concern with our analysis is the process by which countries are selected
into the great power sample might bias our estimates of the role of transport and communication
technologies in determining the extent of military mobilization. To address this possibility, we
conducted an alternative analysis for the period 1816-2000 including 60 di¤erent countries.53
We were able to estimate the same specications for this sample as those featured in our main
analysis with the exception of a measure for precision weapons. Table 5 reports the results for
our main specications. The key result is that the coe¢ cient estimates for Railroad Track are
positive and statistically signicant for this sample as well.54
Finally, our analysis has established a robust partial correlation between railroad penetration,
precision weapon development, and military mobilization. We have further discussed why the
historical pattern of railroad development makes it unlikely that this correlation is driven by
52The results are generally weaker for Military Mobilization and the estimate for Railroad Track is not statisti-
cally signicant for the specication with control variables and a common year trend and only marginally so for
the specication with control variables and country-specic year trends.
53The sample started with all countries with populations over one million who fought interstate wars during this
period. A few countries were eliminated due to missing data. The data sources for this sample are the Correlates
of War dataset (2010), The CHAT dataset (Comin and Hobijn 2009), and the Boix and Rosato (2001) democracy
measures.
54A partial exception to this pattern is the estimate for the Military Mobilization specication with country-
specic time trends for which the p-value is 0.166.
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OLS Estimates
Military Size Mobilization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Railroad Track 10998.810 7225.407 0.106 0.042
(3749.792) (1985.857) (0.042) (0.030)
0.005 0.001 0.014 0.166
Population 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
0.003 0.328 0.562 0.490
GDP per capita -68.023 -58.006 -0.001 -0.002
(49.785) (82.586) (0.001) (0.001)
0.177 0.485 0.039 0.120
Literacy Index 0.213 1.964 0.000 0.000
(1.452) (1.328) (0.000) (0.000)
0.884 0.145 0.854 0.197
Democracy 106.548 291.022 0.012 0.010
(222.631) (294.639) (0.005) (0.007)
0.634 0.327 0.024 0.161
Country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Common Year Trend Yes No Yes No
Country-specic Year Trend No Yes No Yes
Number of Observations 601 601 601 601
Number of Countries 60 60 60 60
Table 5: Military Size and Military Mobilization Expanded Sample, 1816-2000. The table
reports the results of pooled-time-series-cross-sectional OLS regressions for the variable Military
Size and Military Mobilization on a large cross-section of countries with interstate conicts for
1816 to 2000. The table reports the coe¢ cient estimate, robust standard error clustered on
country (in parentheses), and corresponding p-value.
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states building railroads to pursue their military objectives. That said, it is still possible that
there are unobserved factors that led countries during the course of the late 19th and early 20th
century to both build railroads and eld larger armies. One approach to addressing this concern
is to focus on di¤erences in the growth in a single country in army and navy sizes during this
period. Our interpretation of any such di¤erences is that they are attributed to the availability
of the railroad to move and supply soldiers. This di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy controls for
all unobserved factors which inuenced the growth of army and navy sizes similarly over time.
It also controls for di¤erences in the specic intensity of the conicts being compared as long as
those di¤erences inuenced army and navy participation similarly. Specically, we have data on
army and navy size for the UK during the Napoleonic War and during World War I.55 The simple
di¤erence-in-di¤erences in army and navy size between these two conicts is 3,369,733. To put
it slightly di¤erently, while the number of sailors in the navy increased a bit more than 150%,
the growth in the size of the army was 1,231%.56 Even the peace-time di¤erences between these
two periods was substantial. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences in army and navy size for 1791 prior
to the beginning of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and 1913 prior to World War
I is 101,033. Our interpretation of this di¤erential growth pattern in army and navy sizes is
that it is largely due to the ability of railroads to move and supply soldiers, though admittedly
any technological or other factors that di¤erentially a¤ected the usefulness of army and naval
forces in these conicts could account for the disparity.
5.3 Evidence on Conscription Regimes
The bulk of the evidence that we consider in this paper concerns the scale of military mobiliza-
tion, either in absolute numbers, or relative to the size of a countrys population. However,
above we also suggested that there are reasons to believe that states seeking to raise very large
armies will be more likely to resort to conscription of one sort or another.
55We use Navy gures for 1791 and 1813 from House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1860 (168). For Navy
size in 1913, the source is House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1914-16 (96), and we use Navy gures for
1917 from House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1928-29 [Cmd. 3253] . The army numbers for 1791, 1813,
and 1913 come from Floud, Wachter, and Gregory (1990). The army gure for 1917 is from House of Commons
Parliamentary Papers, 1928-29 [Cmd. 3253].
56These comparison use 1813 for the Napoleonic War and 1917 for World War I.
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If we consider each of the above arguments in light of our claims about technology, then they
imply the following causal chain. The state of technology will determine the size of the army
that a state will seek to mobilize. This will in turn inuence the preferred method of recruit-
ment. To test each of the above two arguments we adopt the following strategy. We repeat the
specications we have employed for Military Size and Military Mobilization while substituting
one of two new variables as the dependent variable in the regression. The rst variable, Con-
scription, is a dummy indicator that takes a value of one if a state employs conscription of any
form and zero otherwise. We have already presented our operational denition of conscription
in the sub-section on recruitment methods. The second variable, Universal Conscription take
a value of 1 in cases where universal conscription (as we have previously dened it) is present
and zero if there is either non-universal conscription or recruitment without conscription.
Table 6 reports results of OLS estimates with country xed e¤ects and country-clustered
standard errors where we use alternatively Conscription and Universal Conscription as the
dependent variable. The results for the Railroad Track variable suggest that the expansion of
railroad networks was associated with a shift to universal conscription in particular, but not
with the adoption of conscription of all forms. This ts with the descriptive evidence presented
in section 4.2. We might also expect that our Cruise Missile variable should be correlated with
the type of recruitment regime in place. The availability of cruise missiles might, according to
the two alternative theories, be associated with either a shift away from any type of conscription
or a shift away form universal conscription in particular. However, in Table 6 the coe¢ cient on
the Cruise Missile variable is not statistically signicant.
5.4 Summary
Overall, the results of our analyses in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 provide rm support for our core
argument; one revolution in technology, the railroad, made the era of the mass army possible
while a second revolution involving remote delivery of explosive force helped bring this era to a
close. The results for the railroad are particularly strong and robust to consideration of a wide
variety of factors that might bias our inference.
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Conscription and Universal Conscription
OLS Estimates
Conscription Universal Conscription Universal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Railroad Track -1.259 9.293 2.824 10.851
(4.785) (1.456) (4.804) (1.654)
0.797 0.000 0.568 0.000
Cruise Missile -0.195 -0.319 -0.245 -0.349
(0.439) (0.345) (0.405) (0.433)
0.666 0.373 0.556 0.436
Population, Billions 1.418 1.585 2.038 -3.906
(2.197) (0.823) (4.446) (3.880)
0.531 0.078 0.655 0.334
GDP per capita, Thousands -0.019 0.037 -0.028 0.039
(0.026) (0.012) (0.038) (0.033)
0.476 0.008 0.468 0.260
Literacy Quartile -0.127 0.046 -0.119 0.079
(0.166) (0.038) (0.126) (0.069)
0.457 0.253 0.365 0.273
Democracy 0.293 0.128 0.045 0.208
(0.217) (0.061) (0.192) (0.077)
0.203 0.056 0.820 0.019
Country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Common Year Trend Yes Yes No No
Country-specic Year Trend No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1046 1046 1046 1046
Table 6: Conscription in Great Power Wars, 1600-2000. The table reports the results of pooled-
time-series-cross-sectional OLS regressions for the variables Conscription and Universal. The
table reports the coe¢ cient estimate, robust standard error clustered on country (in parentheses),
and corresponding p-value
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6 Military Mobilization in France
Our pooled analysis explored the plausibility of our argument emphasizing the importance of
technological change in accounting for the scale of warfare. Although there is much to be learned
by a closer look at each of our cases, here we focus on France because it is the case that has most
informed the thinking of political scientists about the evolution of mass armies. Our discussion
of France emphasizes that even in this case, the era of the mass army was largely a late 19th and
20th century phenomena, that coincided with and depended on the technological innovations of
the industrial revolution.
Figure 3 presents our variables Military Size and Military Mobilization for France and high-
lights the peak mobilization years for many of its most important conicts over the last four
centuries. The rst thing to notice about the graph is that the 17th century is a time of dra-
matic growth in the size of the French army and the extent of mobilization. In our data, the
French army reached 362,000 men during the Nine YearsWar with a mobilization rate of al-
most 2 percent. As Lynn (1980, p. 568) puts it, Henri IV felt it necessary to assemble no more
than 55,000 troops in preparation for his still-born campaign of 1610, [while] his grandson Louis
XIV required a force of nearly 400,000 during the Nine YearsWar (1689-1698). Lynn, Parker
(1976), and others have noted this roughly eight-fold increase in the size of the French army
during 17th century wars. While the determinants of this increase are varied, it is interesting
to note that Parker emphasizes, among other factors, the role of transportation. It was not
possible to move large concentrations of troops at speed before the seventeenth century because
there were no roads outside Italy which were capable of carrying a large army, its supply train,
and its artillery(1976, pp 209-210).57 Although this is not the transportation revolution that
we emphasize in this paper, it clearly resonates with our emphasis on how the requirements nec-
essary to move and supply armies placed important limits on the size of army it was desirable
to raise.
The size of the French military varied throughout the many conicts of the 18th century
but prior to the French Revolution it did not signicantly surpass the scale reached at the end
57Parker also emphasizes the importance of changes in military technology (the e¤ectiveness of pikemen reducing
the relative use of cavalry), innovations in public nance, and improvements in bureaucratic administration.
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Figure 3: Military Mobilization in France, 1600-2000. Plot of Military Size and Military Mobi-
lization in France. See appendix for sources. Lines indicate peak moblization years for labeled
conicts
of 17th century. Nonetheless, it is important to note that throughout the 18th century France
elded armies that regularly were over two hundred thousand in number and when needed well
in excess of three hundred thousand. The high point for 18th century army size in our data is
364,086 during the War of Austrian Succession.
This 18th century experience provides the context for interpreting the changes in military
size associated with the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. As Figure 3 indicates, army
size and mobilization did increase with the French Revolution. Our data suggest that Frances
revolutionary army included 732,474 soldiers in 1794 which constituted 0.027 of the population.
In our data, this increase represents almost precisely a doubling of army size from the previous
high point of 1747. Given the substantial population growth during this period, the increase
in mobilization was a more modest 60%. It is worth noting that in subsequent years during
the revolutionary period, mobilization rates returned to lower levels that were not at all unusual
42
in the 18th century (0.017 in 1795, 0.015 in 1796, and 0.014 in 1797). Although our data are
not complete for the Napoleonic period, here larger armies and higher mobilization rates were
sustained over several years. Army size in our data ranged from 504,220 in 1806 to 800,000
in 1812 with mobilization rates exceeding two percent in four of the six years for which we
have estimates, with a peak of 0.027 in 1812. But again, the magnitude of these increases
are more modest than is commonly assumed in political science discussions. They were also
modest in comparison to the increases that France experienced in the 17th century and would
experience in later periods. Peak Napoleonic army size was 2.2 times larger than 1747 and peak
Napoleonic mobilization was 1.6 times larger than 1747. Our results regarding the magnitude of
the revolutionary and Napoleonic mobilizations may seem surprising in light of received wisdom
among political scientists. In fact, our conclusions fall very much in line with recent French
historical work regarding the levée en masse in particular. Annie Crepin (2009 pp.106-107)
suggests that the levée en masse produced an army that was larger but in the end not that
di¤erent in scale from the armies raised by Louis XIV toward the end of his reign.
With that said, there was clearly an increase in army size and mobilization associated with
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in France. The most common factor attributed in
producing this change is the impact of the revolution in mass politics on mobilization. Mass
politics inuenced mobilization in at least two ways. First, as discussed above, the revolution is a
classic example of a radical change toward more equal citizenship. This, and especially the initial
move toward universal conscription, may have made a much broader and more representative
set of the population available and willing to serve. This factor seems clearly important but
most likely incomplete as an account given that mobilization was if anything higher in the
Napoleonic period than the revolutionary period, that some of the advances in citizen rights
had been lost, and that conscription had reverted to a more traditional form in which the rich
and middle class could avoid service. Second, central to the revolution in mass politics was
the development of nationalism, specically the idea of the nation in arms.This ideology was
clearly related to actual changes in citizen rights but also constituted a change in the connection
between individual identity and national service that may have increased Frances ability to
mobilize and command large armies. One might ask why these historic changes did not result
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in a greater increase in army size and mobilization. Van Crevelds (1977, Chapter 2) account of
the challenges of supplying Napoleons armies strongly suggests that the existing technology of
transport and communication limited the size of the armies that France could e¤ectively raise,
command, and support.58
What happened after the Napoleonic era? While there was debate on the subject, we dispose
of clear evidence showing that from a very early date some astute French observers recognized
that the military use of the railroad would transform the nature of warfare. For two examples
of this belief see Chevalier (1841) and Renouard de Sainte-Croix (1837). We also have clear
evidence that after the defeat su¤ered in the Franco-Prussian war, French observers suggested
that Prussias superior rail system had allowed for the Prussian army to mobilize more quickly
and in substantially greater numbers than was the case for the French. For examples of this
view see both Jacquemin (1872) and Tomyar (1882).
By 1914, with an extensive rail system France was in a position to mobilize a much larger
fraction of its population than ever before. The most striking feature of Figure 3 is the size of
the military and levels of mobilization during World War I and more briey during World War
II. Although these mobilizations, which involved over ve million soldiers and over 15 percent of
the population, were foreshadowed by Frances substantial mobilization in the Franco-Prussian
War, the scale of the world wars set them apart from Frances previous mobilizations including
those during the revolutionary and Napoleonic period. In our data, military size in 1918 was 6.6
times larger than in 1812, the peak year of the revolutionary and Napoleonic period. The same
multiple for mobilization was 6.0. Even in the French case, it is the late 19th and early 20th
century that brings mass warfare involving millions of soldiers to the fore. While the Revolution
probably facilitated the ability of the French state to recruit a large army, it was only once the
railroads and other innovations in transportation and communication were present that mass
warfare became a reality.
Finally, Figure 3 also shows the decrease in army size and mobilization in the late 20th
century. This is certainly consistent with our argument that innovations in precision weapons
58 It is worth noting that although we suggest that the development of French nationalism may have had a more
modest e¤ect on army size than is often suggested, it may have inuenced other important outcomes such as the
tactics employed in ghting if, for example, soldiers were less likely to desert because they were motivated by
their new political identities. See Costa and Kahn (2008) and Lynn (2000) on this point.
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made raising mass armies less desirable but other factors could explain the data just as well.
Importantly, France never faced the sort of conict that would necessitate a large army even if
one was both possible and desirable to raise.
7 Conclusion
We know relatively little about the factors that have induced and allowed states to eld mass
armies. There is no shortage of plausible theories, from those focusing on the emergence of
nationalism, changes in political regime, or nally technological change. But systematic tests of
these arguments have been lacking, and a primary reason for this is that the data constraints
for considering changes in military force over the long run are very considerable. In this paper
we have attempted a systematic examination of the factors that produced the era of the mass
army and which have subsequently led to its demise. This question is important both as a
topic in itself, as well as for those interested in understanding the wide variety of important
economic and political development outcomes such as income inequality, progressive taxation,
and welfare state development that have been associated with mass warfare.
Many scholars tend to focus on the importance of political factors when seeking to explain the
arrival of the era of the mass army. Nationalism, it is said, provided the motivation necessary
for the masses to ght, and the extension of citizenship and democratic rights had a similar
e¤ect. But if having soldiers that are motivated is a necessary condition to elding a mass
army, it is certainly not a su¢ cient one. Fielding a mass army also depends on having the
ability to keep it adequately supplied. In addition, governments must actually want to eld
a mass army as opposed to opting for some other format of military force. We have argued
that over the last two centuries these factors depended on the evolution of transportation and
communications technology. The railroad and the telegraph made it possible for the rst time
to eld and command armies numbering in the millions. Today, governments could keep a
mass army supplied if they wanted to, but further advances in transport and communications
technologies have arguably given them less incentive to eld one in the rst place.
We have tested our argument regarding communications and transport technology using a
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new data set that provides a more extensive view of army sizes, mobilization levels, and recruit-
ment methods among major powers than has previously been possible. Our results regarding
the importance of the railroad are quite strong and robust to a number of di¤erent types of ob-
servable and unobservable confounding factors. Our results regarding cruise missile technology
are subject to a greater number of caveats, but they are still consistent with the proposition
that the ability to remotely deliver explosive force with precision has been associated with a
dramatic reduction in army sizes. Overall, the empirical evidence presented in this paper is
strongly consistent with our argument that changes in transport and communications technology
were the critical factor in ushering in the era of the mass army and in leading to its subsequent
demise.
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A Appendix: Data on Military Mobilization
We have constructed a new data set on military mobilization for great powers from 1600 to 2000.
We adopt Levys (1983) denition of a great power as a state that plays a major role in inter-
national politics with respect to security-related issues(p. 16) and adopt his operationalization
of the denition. This creates a sample of thirteen states which were great powers during some
portion of the 1600 to 2000 period.
The key variable in the data set isMilitary Size which is dened as troops under the command
of the national government and intended for use against foreign adversaries. This denition does
not include reserve troops, colonial troops, civil defense units, and domestic police forces. A
common problem with statistics on the size of the military is that states have an incentive to
inate them. We made e¤orts to use numbers that reected actualor e¤ectiveforces rather
than paper forces wherever possible. This included reading historiographies that discussed
potential di¤erences between reported army sizes and actual troops raised. However, for some
cases, the only information we have is on the reported size of the army by the government and
these numbers may exaggerate the size of the military, particularly in earlier periods. The data
discussion for each case provides notes on this issue.
Austria-Hungary 1600-1918
Our data for Austria-Hungarys military for the 17th century is somewhat limited and of uneven
quality. Our initial data are for 1625-1630 and are from Wilson (2009, p. 395, Table 3). For each
year, we report his estimates of the probable e¤ective size of the imperial army in the Thirty
Years War. We do not include any other estimates for the size Austria-Hungarys forces during
the Thirty Years War. Wilson (2009), however, suggests that these forces were not larger than
during this early period. For the years 1649, 1650, 1655, 1656, 1661, 1664, 1668, 1673, 1675,
1677, 1679, 1681, 1683, 1684, 1685, and 1687, we have estimates from Hochedlinger (2003, p.
104, Table 3). These numbers are primarily estimates of e¤ective strength except for 1664, 1679,
1684, and 1685. For the years 1695 to 1794, Dickson (1987b, p343-352) provides data on o¢ cial
infantry and cavalry sizes for the Empire. These o¢ cial numbers, therefore, reect an upper
bound of the size of Austrian-Hungarian forces. We identied estimates of Austrian-Hungarian
forces for 1809 and 1813 in Rothenberg (1973). The latter number indicates the high point
of Austrian-Hungarian mobilization during the Napoleonic Wars and should also be treated as
an o¢ cial, possibly inated estimate. Finally, for 1816 to 1918, we used Correlates of War,
National Material Capabilities, Version 4.0 (2010) numbers for the size of Austria-Hungarys
military forces.
Population data for Austria-Hungary are also from several sources. For 1600 and 1650, we
used data reported in Wilson (2009, p. 788, Table 8). For 1740, 1754, 1762, 1768, and 1787, the
data are from Dickson (1987a, p. 36, Table 2.5) and refer to the central lands of the Habsburg
monarchy. Finally, for 1816 through 1918, the data are from the Correlates of War Project
(2010). Missing years for population were interpolated.
China 1949-2000
We used military personnel and population data from Correlates of War (2010) for China. These
data should be interpreted cautiously as they may inate the actual size of Chinese forces. We
note further that for the period just prior to Chinas great power status, Gittings (1967 pp.
54
303-305) provides an informative account of the Peoples Liberation Army from the beginning
of the Japanese war in 1937 through 1958. Since these gures are only for the PLA and not the
KMT army during the anti-Japanese war and subsequent civil war, total Chinese mobilization
during this period will be understated. Gittings (p. 1) also provides partial details on the size of
the KMT army. He suggests 1.5 million troops in 1945 and 1.5 million again in 1947. Gittings
also suggests that o¢ cial gures for the KMT army were substantially higher (upwards of 5
million) raising again the issue of inated o¢ cial numbers.
France 1600-2000
Data on the French army during the 17th century are from three sources: David Parrott (2001),
John Lynn (1997) and John Lynn (2006). Our rst gure is from Parrott (2001, p. 183). It
represents the peacetime establishment of the army in the rst decade of the 17th century. We
use this number for the year 1605. The gure for 1630 is also from Parrott (2001, p. 187).
Parrott (2001, p. 194) mentions that "some 65,000 infantry and 9,000 - 9,500 cavalry were
briey operational" at the beginning of the 1635 campaign. We use the number of 74,250 for
this year. According to Parrott (2001, p. 199), for a short period in 1636, France probably
reached the highest number of men under arms ("70,000 - 80,000 infantry and 10,000 - 15,000
cavalry") during the time of Richelieu and Mazarin. We use for this year the number of 87,500
given by the sum of mid-point estimates for the size of both the infantry and the cavalry. On
the basis of Parrott (2001, p. 202) who writes that probably "some 60,000 - 70,000 infantry and
cavalry were either in existence or levied during the rst months of 1637", we use the gure of
65,000 for this year. The gure for 1660 is from Lynn (1997, p. 45 and Table 2.1, p.55; 2006, p.
53) and gives the o¢ cial peacetime strength of the army. Additional gures provide estimates of
the size of the army during the wars that France fought in the second half of the 17th century.
According to Lynn (1997, p. 46 and Table 2.1, p. 55; 2006, p. 54), the strength of the army
in 1668 (during the War of Devolution) was on paper 134,000 men. Data for the years 1678
(Lynn, 1997, p. 46, p. 51 and Table 2.1, p. 55; Lynn, 2006, p. 54) and 1693 (Lynn, 2006,
p.57) are estimates of the e¤ective size of the army during the Dutch War and the Nine Years
War, respectively. Further data refer to the o¢ cial strength of the army in years of peace in
the second half of the 17th century. The rst one (year 1669) is provided by Lynn (1997, p. 46;
2006, p. 53). The second one is for the year 1679 (Lynn, 1997, p. 46; Lynn, 2006, p.53); the
third one refers to the year 1684 (Lynn, 1997, p. 47; Lynn, 2006, p.53).
Our rst data for the 18th century (year 1710) is from Lynn (1997, p. 48 and p.55; 2006,
p. 54 and p. 58) and it gives an estimate of the actual strength of the army during the War
of Spanish Succession. Data for the period 1720-1790 are from two sources: Sturgill (1991) and
Gebelin (1881). The former provides gures about the strength of the army. Before 1763, this
source includes the militia only if it was on active service (see Sturgill, 1991, p. 129). Sturgills
gures, therefore, do not comprise the militia for the years of peace and of war demobilization
before 1763. Prior to that year, militia gures are not included in the armys strength also for
some of the years of war preparation (1720, 1726-27, 1756) and are missing for some of the
years of war (1757-63). When Sturgills gures on the armys strength do not incorporate the
militia, we add to them the number of e¤ectives of the provincial militias (soldiers and o¢ cers)
provided by Gebelin (1881, p. 285). Finally, for the years from 1720 to 1763 in which gures on
the militia are not available either from Sturgill or from Gebelin, we assign a missing value to
our series. By adopting these coding criteria, we are able to compute gures on the strength of
the army including the militia for the following years: 1726, 1728-1736, 1742-1749, 1756-1758,
55
and 1761. Starting from 1764, gures on the strength of the army provided by Sturgill include
militia and miscellaneous units, so we use these data for the years from 1764 to 1790. These
gures should be considered as an upper bound estimate of the French army, since, as Sturgill
(1991, p. 131) points out, militia troops were not likely to be ready immediately in the case of a
mobilization for war. Data for the years 1794-97 are troop estimates reported to the Assembly.
They are provided by Bertaud (1988, p. 272).
As it concerns the Napoleonic period, the gures for the years 1804, 1806-8, and 1811-12 are
taken from Delmas (1992, p. 317). They represent the paper strength of the Imperial Army.
Finally, the gures on the size of the military forces for the period 1816-2000 are from Correlates
of War, National Material Capabilities, Version 4.0 (2010).
Data for our time series of the French population are taken from several sources. Figures for
the years 1600, 1650 and 1700 are from De Vries (2007, p. 36, Table 3.6). We use the estimates
of the French population provided by Mathias and OBrien (1976, p. 604, Table 1) for the years
1715, 1725, 1730, 1735, 1740, 1745, 1750, 1755, 1765, 1770, 1775, 1780, 1785, and 1790. We
take the data for the years 1801 1945 from Institut National de la Statistique et des Études
Économiques (1966, p. 66-73, Tables 1 A - 1 D); for the years 1946 1984 from Institut National
de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (1990, p. 26, Table 1); for the years 1985-1994 from
Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (1997, p. 49, Table B.01-1); for
the years 1995-99 from Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (2002,
p. 49, Table B.01-1); for the year 2000 from Institut National de la Statistique et des Études
Économiques (2007, p. 41, Table B.01-1). Missing data in our time series of the population
have been interpolated.
Italy 1861-1943
We used military personnel from the Correlates of War (2010) for Italy. The population data
come from Istituto Centrale di Statistica (1976), Sommario di Statistiche Storiche dellItalia
1861-1975, Table 10 Popolazione residente calcolata a ne anno dal 1861 al 1975, p.16, Roma.
Japan 1905-1945
We used military personnel from Correlates of War (2010) for Japan. The population data come
from Ministry of Internal A¤airs and Communications, Statistics Bureau, Historical Statistics
of Japan, Chapter 2 Population and Household, Population by Sex, Population Increase and
Decrease, Population Density (18722009) (Accessed at: http://www.stat.go.jp/english/
data/chouki/02.htm).
Netherlands 1609-1713
We used two principal sources for estimating Dutch army strength. Most historians use the
Staatsche Leger, an early twentieth century source that although it sounds archival was not.
These numbers should be treated as nominal or paper strength. Van Nimwegen (2006) presents
a more contemporary set of estimates of e¤ective strength. We use van Nimwegen wherever
possible, but use the Staatsche Leger when we have no other estimates. To summarize, we use
van Nimwegen for 1609 (this actually van Nimwegens number for 1608 but is the closest number
we have for the start of the period), 1629, 1640, and 1672 and the Staatsche Leger for 1618,
1625, 1635, 1645, 1657, 1667, 1675, 1683, 1692, 1699, and 1708. The population data is from
Maddison (2003) and is linearly interpolated.
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Ottoman Empire 1600-1699
The Ottoman army during the 17th century was comprised primarily of two groups. The rst
group is the sultans permanent, standing army made of infantry (Janissaries), cavalry, and
the artillery corps. We have estimates for this total for eleven years during the 17th century.
The second group is the seasonally-mobilized, provincial cavalry. For 1609, our estimate of the
standing army is from Murphey (1999). For 1660, we used Agoston (1999) and Murphey (1999)
for the infantry estimate and Agoston (2005) for the artillery corps estimate. We used Murpheys
(1999) estimate for the standing cavalry in 1670 to estimate the size of the cavalry in 1660. For
1670, we used Murphey (1999). For 1687, 1690-94, 1996, and 1698, we used Tabakoglu (1985)
for our estimate of the total standing army. We relied on the discussion in Murphey (1999)
and Aksan (2007) to arrive at a single estimate of 70,000 for the e¤ective size of the provincial
cavalry. This number is added to the total standing army for the eleven years that we have data
for the 17th century to compute our total estimate for each year.
The population data is from McEvedy and Jones (1978) for 1600 and 1700 and is linearly
interpolated. See Braudel (1972), Barkan (2000), and Quataert (2000) for additional estimates
and discussion.
Prussia/Germany/West Germany 1740-2000
For Prussia, data on military strength is available from a number of sources including Craig
(1955), Wilson (1998), Jany (1914), Correlates of War (2010), and the European State Finance
Database. From 1740 to 1870, we rely primarily on Jany because his numbers are the most
complete time series and are very close to the numbers in the other sources. In all cases, every
e¤ort was made to report either actual troop numbers or estimates adjusted to reect actual
troop strength. From 1871 to 2000, we use Correlates of War (2010) numbers. The data for
1955 to 1989 are for West Germany only.
Population data for Prussia for 1740 to 1865 are from Dincecco (2009) and for 1866 to 1870
are from Mauersberg (1988). We use Correlates of War population data for the remaining years
of the series and again the data for 1955 to 1989 are for West Germany only.
Russia/Soviet Union 1721-2000
Our data for Russias military in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century are collected from
a number of sources. The value for 1721 comes from a 1720 budget approved by Peter the Great
(Keep 1985, p. 137); as such, the number most likely reects an upper bound on the actual
army size. Values for 1725, 1731, 1734, 1740, 1756, 1763, 1765, 1795, 1796 all come from Pintner
(1984; estimates for 1740 and 1756 come from p. 233, and the rest are from p. 253, Table 5).
For the table, Pintner cites two sources: von Stein (1859, pp. 92, 100, 151, 359) and Beskrovny
(1959, pp. 58, 330). The data points for 1801, 1811, and 1815 are estimates of the Russian
State Military Archives (RGVIA) as reported by Beskrovny (1973, pp. 12, 15). For all reported
estimates, we attempted to validate all numbers with estimates from other sources for the same
time period. From 1816 onwards, we take for the size of Russias military forces from Correlates
of War (2010).
We take estimates of Russias population before 1816 from Kabuzan (1963, p. 164, Table
18). These data comes from a series of revisions to an unpublished 1702 government census:
1719, 1744, 1762, 1728, 1795, 1811, 1815. From 1816-2007, we use population estimates from
Correlates of War (2010). Missing years for population were interpolated. Note: the rst data
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point for population in the series (1721) is the number reported in the 1719 revision to the
census.
Spain 1600-1808
For Spain, we have limited information about the size of the military. For 1600, we use Parkers
(1976, p. 206, Table 1) estimate for the 1590s. Similarly, we use Parker (1976) for estimates
for 1635, 1655, 1675, and 1705. Unfortunately, we have no further estimates on the overall size
of the Spanish military for the remainder of the 18th century and into the 19th century when
they were a great power. Parker (1972) provides additional detailed information on the Army of
Flanders but again this data is for the 17th century. Population data is from Maddison (2003)
and is linearly interpolated.
Sweden 1617-1721
For Swedish military forces, we have several high quality sources including Roberts (1968),
Roberts (1979), Aberg (1973), and Nordmann (1972). These sources, however, provide numbers
for only six years during the period that Sweden was a major power. We use Nordmann (1972,
p. 135 ) for 1630. For 1632, we use Roberts (1979, p. 44). Nordman cites a lower gure for
this year but this is derived from earlier work by Roberts. We again use Nordmann for 1637 (p.
137), 1697 (p. 141), 1700 (p. 143), and 1707 (p. 144). Finally, Roberts (1979, p. 45) provides
a number for 1708. Population data is from Maddison (2003) and is linearly interpolated.
United Kingdom 1600-2000
The rst two data on the size of the army in the 17th century refer to the years 1652 and 1660.
They are provided by Firth (1902, p. 35). We use gures on the strength of the army from
Childs (1996, p. 47) for the years 1670 and 1678. For the year 1685 (December), we report the
data on the number of soldiers in England under James II provided by Childs (1980, p. 2). Two
additional gures refer to the o¢ cial strength of the army at the end of October 1688 (Childs,
1980, p. 3) and in April 1689 (Childs, 1987, p. 102). It is worth noting that the last number does
not include the Dutch troops stationing in England in that year (on this point, see Childs, 1987,
p. 102 and French, 1990, p. 8). The main source for our data on the British military forces for
the years from 1691 to 1815 is Floud, Wachter, and Gregory (1990). For the period 1691-1714
we use their data on the establishment of the army (Floud, Wachter, and Gregory, 1990, p.
44, Table 2.1). The o¢ cial strength of the British military forces for the years 1715, 1718-19,
1723, and 1728-55 is given by the sum of the establishment of the army (Floud, Wachter, and
Gregory, 1990, pp. 44-45, Table 2.1) and of the navy (Floud, Wachter, and Gregory, 1990, p.
68, Table 2.6). For the period 1756-1773 we add up the gures for the establishment of the army
(Floud, Wachter, and Gregory, 1990, p. 45, Table 2.1), of the navy and of the marines which
are reported in Floud, Wachter, and Gregory, 1990, pp. 68-69, Table 2.6. For the period going
from the year 1774 to the year 1815, we are able to provide estimates of the actual strength
of the British military forces. In specic, for the years 1774-83 and 1785-1815 we use data on
the e¤ective size of the army provided by Floud, Wachter, and Gregory, 1990, pp. 45-46, Table
2.1. We add to these numbers the gures about the Seamen (including O¢ cers), Boys, and
Marines (. . . ) actually Borne in the naval service for the years 1774-83 and 1785-1815. The
source for these last data is the House of Commons Parliamentary Paper, 1860 (168). For the
years 1816-2000 we use the data on the military forces provided by Correlates of War (2010).
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The time series of the total population is constructed in the following manner. For the years
from 1600 to 1706 we take the population of England and Wales. We add the population of
Scotland to that of England and Wales for the period 1707 1800. For the years going from
1801 to 1921 we sum the population of Ireland to that of England, Wales and Scotland. Finally,
for the years from 1922 to 2000 the total population corresponds to the sum of the population
of England & Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
The source for the total population of England and Wales in the years 1650 and 1700 is
De Vries (2007, p. 36, Table 3.6). Missing data are interpolated. We take the estimates of
the Welsh population in 1701, 1751, 1781, and 1801 from Deane and Cole, 1967, p. 103, Table
24. Missing values are interpolated. We use these data as an estimate of the population of
Wales for the years 1701 to 1800. The source for the population of England (which does not
include Monmouthshire) for the years 1701 1800 is Mitchell (1988, pp. 7-8). Mitchell (1988,
pp. 11-14) provides data on the overall population of England & Wales for the years 1801 to
1980. We turn to Deane and Cole (1967, p. 6, Table 2) for estimates of the population of
Scotland in 1701, 1751, 1791, and 1801. We interpolate missing data and use this series for
the years 1707 1800. We take data on the Scottish population for 1801 1980 from Mitchell
(1988, pp. 11-14). Figures on the population of Ireland for 1801-1921 are taken from Mitchell
(1988, pp. 11-13). The population of Northern Ireland for the years 1922 1980 are provided
by Mitchell (1988, pp. 13-14). Finally, the data on the population of the United Kingdom for
the years 1981 2000 are taken from the O¢ ce of National Statistics, Population estimates for
UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland current datasets. Data are available
at: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/Product.asp?vlnk=15106.
United States 1898-2000
The military personnel data for 1898 to 1995 are active duty personnel from all branches ex-
cluding the Coast Guard. The source for these data is the Historical Statistics of the United
States, vol. 5, Table Ed26-47, Military personnel on active duty, by branch of service and sex:
1789-1995, p. 5-353-359. The data for 1996 to 2000 are from Correlates of War (2010). The
population data for the United States for 1898 to 1929 are from the Historical Statistics of the
United States, vol. 1, Table Aa9-14, National population and the demographic components of
change: 1790-2000, p. 1-30-33. From 1930 to 1949, we used Historical Statistics of the United
States, vol. 1, Table Aa6-8, Population 1790-2000, p. 1-28-29. And from 1950 to 2000, the
population data are from U.S. Census Bureau, National Estimates and Projections, Table 2,
Population, accessed from http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/population.html.
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